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Abstract 
The WTO provides an opportunity to observe the recent creation, development and 
operation of a "hard law" adjudicative legal system, with legal subjects of greatly 
varying degrees of power, embedded within an intensely political environment. 
Between these parallel political and legal communities there are numerous points of 
contact. At each point of contact one finds played out (or to be played out) and 
resolved, re-iteratively, the basic drama between power-based and rules-based 
approaches to disputes. An examination of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
and of subsequent developments - from the particular perspective of a participant 
within the WTO legal system - suggests that the rules-based approach was initiated 
in a somewhat low profile manner. Once the process had been quietly booted-up, 
ambiguity and discretion embedded in the rules has been systematically 
crystallizing, under the influence of lawyers and adjudicators acting both in and out 
of the court room, so as to substantially further develop and consolidate a more 
complete rules-based operating system. This is something to which the Members 
themselves do not appear to have objected. In the long term, the fundamental 
driving motor for this process, which ultimately outweighs all other considerations, 
is a necessity recognised by all participants and their constituents – that is, legal 
security and predictability for firms engaged in international trade. However, the 
legitimacy of particular outcomes will ultimately continue to rest upon the 
rationality, reasonableness and openness of adjudicators and their judgments. This 
repetitive process of shared experience and palliative outcome is progressively 
binding the political and legal communities together in a shared fate. The process is 
proving remarkably successful, and may both serve as a model for (and have spill-
over effects in) other areas of international law. Ultimately, the system's continued 
success depends upon jealously guarding the independence of adjudicators, 
including the process by which they are selected, as well as ensuring the availability 
of effective remedies. 
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Introduction 
The Green Room is a relatively small dark room in the vicinity of the office of the 
WTO Director General, in the WTO building in Geneva, frequently used for 
negotiations among a limited number of WTO Members, particularly as a round 
draws to a close.1 GATT or WTO negotiating rounds are monumental enterprises, 
extending over many years and encompassing a vast range of topics. Typically, 
WTO Members do not disclose their final positions from the outset in their written 
proposals. Rather, they keep their cards close to their chests until the eleventh 
hour. The Green Room is where the end game is played out. It is a secret place, for 
the invited few. There is generally no official public written record of what 
transpires. Essentially, it’s a question of horse-trading among diplomats and 
politicians. Inevitably, the domestic constituency of one WTO Member is played-off 
against the unrelated domestic constituency of another.2 Thus, the Green Room is a 
place of favour and perfidy – it is the essence of politics, that is, the art of the 
possible. It rather reminds me of the board game Cluedo. Who betrayed the 
domestic constituent? It was the Ambassador, in the Green Room, with a knife in 
the back. The corpse is generally quietly rolled-up in some ambiguous language (of 
general and prospective application) and dumped in a footnote or a schedule. 
Fingers crossed that no one will find it, for a few years at least. 
 
Just downstairs, in the same building, is the large and luminous Court Room, by 
which I mean to refer most particularly to the WTO Appellate Body.3 I use the term 
"court" deliberately notwithstanding several years of academic debate as to 
whether or not the Appellate Body is aptly described as a court. In my view, also 
comparing my experience in the English courts and before the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, there is no doubt that the Appellate Body is aptly described in 
those terms. It is easily the most judicial instance before which I have litigated. The 
Court Room is the place where, years later (generally long after the Ambassador 
has received his final posting), and in the context of a particular set of facts (that 
is, a case) the corpse and to a lesser extent the scene of the crime4, are 
forensically examined. It is, increasingly, an open place, where any member of the 
public can attend. Its proceedings are a matter of public record. Armed with the 
instruments of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, as 
codified, at least in part, in the Vienna Convention, the legal and to a considerable 
extent the factual issues are systematically examined in minute detail. Thus, the 
                                                 
1 The WTO web site puts it in the following terms: 
"One term has become controversial, but more among some outside observers than among delegations. 
The “Green Room” is a phrase taken from the informal name of the director-general’s conference room. 
It is used to refer to meetings of 20–40 delegations, usually at the level of heads of delegations. These 
meetings can take place elsewhere, such as at Ministerial Conferences, and can be called by the minister 
chairing the conference as well as the director-general. Similar smaller group consultations can be 
organized by the chairs of committees negotiating individual subjects, although the term Green Room is 
not usually used for these. In the past delegations have sometimes felt that Green Room meetings could 
lead to compromises being struck behind their backs. So, extra efforts are made to ensure that the 
process is handled correctly, with regular reports back to the full membership." (WTO.org 2011). 
2 This may be compared with the position in the rules-based arena of dispute settlement. Article 3.10 of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) (WTO 1994) 
provides that: "It is understood that complaints and counter-complaints in relation to distinct matters 
should not be linked". 
3 Appellate Body hearings take place in a number of different rooms. I am here referring particularly to 
the Eric Wyndham White Room – the principal WTO meeting room where large appeal hearings are often 
held. 
4 That is, the preparatory work and the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty (Vienna 
Convention, Article 32). 
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Court Room is a place of truth and justice - it is the essence of law, that is, the art 
of the rational and the reasonable. 
It is almost as if some mischievous unseen student of politics and law has set the 
whole thing up as an experiment, just to see what might happen when essence of 
politics and essence of law are mixed so closely and immediately together,5 which 
does sometimes make me feel like a bit of a lab rat.6 But perhaps the outcome of 
this experiment is not very surprising. After all, if one puts lawyers together in a 
legal arena it is surely not very surprising if they do what lawyers generally do. 
That is, they work with rules to resolve disputes, secreting as they go their legal 
view of the world, like ants building a nest or bees a hive. Once the process is 
initiated, or as one former Member of the Appellate Body has put it, once the 
"genetic code" is in place (Abi-Saab 2006), it’s a bit like the point at which robots 
start designing robots (or computers computers). Perhaps it would be an 
exaggeration to describe the process as exponential, but at least by comparison 
with what has gone before it is probably fair to say that it is accelerated.  
The first section of this paper contains some brief observations on how it could be 
that such a thing as the WTO could ever come about, viewed from the limited 
perspective of a practitioner within the system, and particularly the DSU itself. It 
seems remarkable and surprising that so many powerful nations should subject 
themselves to binding adjudication. So if one would wish to emulate it in other 
areas, it might be helpful to better understand the details of how it was done and 
who might have contributed to it. The key document must be the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. But it is hardly a blueprint of the building we seem to 
have today, since almost all of the important features are either not in it at all or 
barely apparent from it. If anything, it's more like one of those building application 
notices that we pay little or no attention to, returning from holiday to find 
construction substantially completed and apparently irreversible (absent an 
earthquake). We might like the architecture, but it may not be exactly what 
everyone anticipated. 
The second section of this paper turns to a more theoretical discussion of the way 
in which power is both exercised and limited in the court room, again, drawing 
particularly on my experiences as a litigator within the WTO system. Whilst I agree 
with Abbot and Snidal (2000) that politics and international law are "deeply 
intertwined", that politics "permeates" international law and that the two are 
"deeply connected", nevertheless essentially the whole point of creating the WTO 
was to emphasise the separation between politics and law. Thus, the idea here is 
that in order to better understand how non-legal considerations can actually 
penetrate (or be excluded from) a WTO legal analysis, it is helpful to have a good 
understanding of the anatomy of a WTO judgment. This involves sharpening our 
thinking about concepts such as legislative "ambiguity" and judicial "activism" or 
"gap-filling", as well as concepts such as law, fact, evidence, claim, argument, 
substance, procedure, interpretation, application, and so forth. 
In the third section of this paper I turn to the question of the way in which WTO 
judges have actually handled adjudication, including both the legal and non-legal 
considerations that they may have brought to the process. Since space does not 
permit an entire survey of the WTO case law, and since it would be problematic to 
take a sample that is at the same time both objective and relevant, I have focussed 
on what one might think of as the self-referential aspects of the WTO dispute 
                                                 
5 In other words, the WTO is probably the best current example of "incomplete contracting" combined 
with "delegation" to "judicial institutions" described in Abbot and Snidal (2000). 
6 As the old joke goes, it may not be such a bad idea to replace lab rats with lawyers, since it stops the 
researcher from getting too attached to the subject, and there are certain things that even rats won't do. 
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settlement system.7 That is, I have looked at what one might think of as the 
badges or operating system of a court, and considered the way in which these 
issues have been handled by WTO adjudicators both in and out of the courtroom. 
One advantage of this is that in such cases I think we see the adjudicators showing 
their true colours. That is because what is at stake is not the particular trade 
interest of a WTO Member, but rather something that is close to the heart of the 
adjudicator (or should be), namely the integrity and effectiveness of the 
adjudicative system itself. A second related advantage is that, when it comes to 
considering what the Members make of this, we filter out the background noise 
associated with a particular trade interest. Perhaps not surprisingly, the picture that 
emerges is that, once the system has been booted-up, it is fairly inevitable that the 
rules will be used to consolidate a rules-based operating system. Interestingly, the 
general response of Members and academia to this process appears to be rather 
positive, its legitimacy resting substantially on the quality of the judgments – that 
is the rational and reasonable way they explain their conclusions. 
In the fourth section of this paper I briefly take a look at the way in which Members 
have responded to this process, particularly in the context of the continuing 
negotiations concerning reform of the DSU. 
My conclusion is that the WTO has "got it right". The key to its success is simple 
enough: agreements should be kept,8 and security and predictability (DSU, Article 
3.2) demand an exhaustive and rigorous interpretation and application of the law 
according to consistently applied interpretative rules. The only two potential 
problems I see are with the selection of adjudicators and the enforcement of 
judgments – the two loose ends, as it were, at each end of the system, where in 
my view the excessive influence of politics and economics respectively is yet to be 
curbed. Furthermore, I do not see the success of the DSU as creating an imbalance 
within the WTO between judicial and political activity. Rather, I tend to think that 
there is a constant feedback loop or symbiotic relationship between the juridical 
and political branches: the political community needs and relies on the judges to 
complete their agreement; and the judges ultimately need and rely upon the 
political commitment of the Members, not least when it comes to compliance. The 
paper concludes with some suggestions about how this interactive process might be 
seen not as an imbalance, but as a virtuous cycle, and managed and developed so 
as to contribute to the objectives of the WTO. 
1. From power-based GATT to rules-based WTO: quietly booting the system 
It is often observed that one of the features of the WTO that makes it different from 
the GATT is binding adjudication – the WTO dispute settlement system is often 
described as the "jewel in the crown" of the WTO system. I certainly agree with 
that observation.9 It is true that it has been suggested that compliance rates are 
not much better under the WTO than they were under the GATT (Hudec 1993). 
However, I am not particularly persuaded by that argument. I rather think the WTO 
system of remedies is still very much in its infancy, and that there is still a great 
deal more to come. And I also think that it is likely that many more issues are 
being resolved without recourse to litigation simply because the possibility of 
binding adjudication is there.  
                                                 
7 For a general discussion, see:  Sacerdoti et al. (2006), Part II: Trade Negotiations and Dispute 
Settlement: What Balance between Political Governance and Judicialization. For a persuasive refutation 
of the charge of judicial "activism" in more substantive terms see: Howse (2006) and Davey (2006). 
8 As the recitals of the Vienna Convention put it: "Noting that the principles of free consent and of good 
faith and the pacta sunt servanda rules are universally recognised." Pacta sunt servanda may be 
translated as "agreements should be kept". 
9 I would therefore not agree with the proposition that the benefits flowing from hard law adjudication in 
the WTO could also be reaped through a soft law mechanism (Abbot and Snidal 2000).  
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This being so, one of the intriguing questions is how on earth such a powerful 
international judicial system happened to come into existence in the first place. 
Leaving aside the difficulty for smaller WTO Members to make effective use of 
remedies, at least as the DSU is currently interpreted, one of the effects of an 
adjudicative system, indeed essentially the whole point of it, is that all subjects are 
equal in the eyes of the law. Thus, essentially, the rules-based system protects 
weaker WTO Members. It is perhaps understandable that the EU, the birth and 
development of which would not have been possible without the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, might support such a project. It is perhaps more remarkable 
that the US was willing to do so, recalling that the International Trade Organisation 
originally failed because the US Congress failed to ratify the Havana Charter.  
In the context of the Uruguay Round, no doubt the Members were looking to move 
to a system of binding dispute settlement given years of GATT frustration in that 
respect.  It also appears that the US was interested in exploiting its comparative 
advantage in IT, services and IP and that there was a particular configuration of 
other circumstances that favoured the conclusion of the round (Howse and 
Nicolaidis 2006). It seems that the US was of the view that it generally complied 
with the rules, and that binding adjudication was necessary in order to ensure that 
others would (US Communication 1987).10 Notwithstanding this initial view, 
subsequent events have demonstrated that the US and indeed also the EU have 
frequently lost WTO cases. It should be noted, however, that many of these are 
trade remedy cases and particularly anti-dumping cases. In retrospect, it should 
probably come as no surprise that other Members should seek unobstructed entry 
to such important markets as the US and the EU. It should also come as no surprise 
that they have often been successful in litigation. In economic terms, the Anti-
Dumping Agreement is clearly increasingly irrational in an increasingly integrated 
                                                 
10That document reads as follows: "The US delegation believes that an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism, which is seen to be both reliable and expeditious, is an essential element of a healthy, 
expanding international trading system. The present dispute settlement system of the GATT has 
performed reasonably well in a number of disputes; however, it has displayed conspicuous shortcomings 
in some cases, which have diminished its credibility and, with it, confidence in the larger institution -- 
the GATT. 
The most obvious problem is that some disputes have not been resolved, perhaps partly because of 
inadequate panel reports or difficult rules in a few cases, but more often because one or more parties 
have been unwilling to allow a resolution. In addition, the process takes too much time. Partly this is 
again a problem of the attitude of parties; for example, a party whose measures are challenged will all 
too often claim the need for further consultations as a means of stalling. This occurs even when an issue 
has already been stalemated through lengthy informal and formal consultations, sometimes over a 
period of years. Delays also arise from the difficulty of finding willing, qualified panellists, haggling over 
terms of reference, and delaying tactics during a panel's work. The failure to resolve disputes 
expeditiously (or in some cases to act at all) leads to frustration, and diminishes respect not only for 
dispute settlement but for rights and obligations under the GATT. 
Improvement of the GATT dispute mechanism, therefore, deserves high priority. But any attempt to 
improve the mechanism needs to be supported by a change in attitude of contracting parties. Too often, 
dispute settlement in the GATT is viewed as a zero-sum contest in which for every winner there must be 
a loser. Disputing parties focus on the narrow issue at stake rather than their broader interests in an 
effective trading system. In truth, the failure to resolve disputes satisfactorily can be costly, not only to 
the disputants, but to innocent third parties as well. Successful dispute settlement, on the other hand, 
can benefit both the complaining party and the party whose actions gave rise to the complaint. 
Improvements in the system and the attitude of governments toward the process of dispute settlement 
are not independent variables. Any process for settling disputes among sovereign States, however well 
designed, can be frustrated by a determined disputant. An effective process, however, can create an 
atmosphere of confidence leading to greater reliance by governments on that process in preference to 
situations in which problems fester or in which governments are led to unilateral actions. 
The primary objective of dispute settlement should be to resolve disputes, and to do so expeditiously, 
fairly and in a manner that is consistent with the trade expansion objectives of the GATT. If we are all 
prepared genuinely to accept this objective, then we think we can move forward quickly in this area of 
negotiations. Reform will mean a better trading system for all contracting parties, not a trade-off among 
interests of different industries or countries. It is evident that many delegations have been giving 
considerable thought to the problems which have plagued the GATT dispute settlement process in recent 
years. For our part we will, prior to the next meeting of this Group, submit some proposals to improve 
the system. We hope other delegations will do so as well." 
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global economy. It has no preamble, the drafters apparently not even bothering to 
make an attempt to explain its rationale. The only mystery is why a date for its 
abolition is not on the table in current negotiations (a sunset clause for the Anti-
Dumping Agreement). Against this background it is not altogether surprising that 
domestic anti-dumping authorities, who are often client-captured to some extent by 
their domestic industries, and who often lack the sharp legal perspective of the 
Appellate Body, should tend to push the boundaries of "interpretation" beyond 
reasonable limits, and so subsequently lose the case before the WTO.  
In short, when we witness a certain reaction by some WTO Members, such as the 
US, to adverse WTO rulings, particularly by the Appellate Body (US Zeroing 
Communications),11 what we are witnessing is probably not a lack of commitment 
on the part of the US to the rules-based system as such. Rather, what we are 
probably witnessing is the death throes of an anachronistic set of rules, 
accompanied by the shrill complaint of vested domestic interests that sporadically 
manage to capture the relevant channels of communication.12 Recent changes in 
US policy support this view, insofar as the emphasis has been placed on enforcing 
the WTO Agreement against other Members, notably China (especially in the area 
of intellectual property), attack perhaps being seen as the best form of defence. 
Interestingly, and cleverly, China's initial compliance record appears to be 
excellent. China appears ready to absorb the economic pain of compliance, which is 
probably limited in any event for such a large economy; and to value the political 
reputation that goes with being a law-abiding Member of the club. Of course, China 
does not have Congress or anything quite like it with which to contend. It remains 
to be seen how this fascinating dynamic develops over the next few years. 
Another aspect of the coming into existence of the WTO dispute settlement system 
that I think is fascinating is a number of features that I would describe as "under 
the radar". By this I mean to refer to certain features of what is undoubtedly a very 
"hard law" system that look as though they might have been designed to disguise it 
as softer than it really is.  
For example, the WTO Court's rules of procedure are called: "Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)". The use of the 
term "understanding" of course suggests something that might be "soft" (although 
the document itself is obviously very "hard"). There are other "understandings" that 
form part of the WTO package and they are often, in my view, for one reason or 
another, significantly softer than the DSU.  
Reading on through the DSU, before we get to the judicial bodies, Article 2 already 
introduces the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which of course is a political body. 
We learn that it is the DSB that has the power to establish panels, adopt reports 
and authorise countermeasures, and even more reassuringly that it takes decisions 
by consensus, defined as no Member present at the meeting formally objecting. We 
also learn, in Article 3.1, that Members affirm their adherence to the principles for 
the management of disputes under the GATT – the message being that this is 
evolution (when in fact it is revolution). Article 4 is all about "Consultations" and 
Article 5 "Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation" – that is, "soft" dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
It is only when we get to Article 6.1 ("Establishment of Panels") that we get the 
first hint of something much "harder": at the request of a complaining party, a 
                                                 
11 These types of documents are colloquially referred to in WTO circles as "bad loser" documents. 
12 In other words, if it is sometimes a puzzle to understand precisely why states bind themselves into a 
hard law adjudicative system (Abbot and Snidal 2000) perhaps sometimes the straightforward answer is 
that some persons simply misjudge their own capacity to comply with the rules. 
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panel shall be established by the DSB, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to 
establish a panel. But consider the way this is drafted. The language about the DSB 
deciding not to establish a panel is obviously redundant verbiage, since no WTO 
Member is going to request a panel and then participate in a consensus decision not 
to establish it. The only explanation for the presence of this language is that it is 
designed to obfuscate, or at least facilitate the adoption of a revolutionary rule by 
using familiar language (the language of consensus) to delimit it. It is not at all 
clear that a casual reader will immediately spot the significance of this language, 
not least given the earlier expressly stated rule that the DSB is to decide by 
consensus. In fact, it is not at all apparent from this provision that when the DSB 
establishes a panel it does not act by "decision" at all, but by "action" (this is the 
formal title of the WTO document subsequently circulated to all Members), an 
innocuous term that appears only in Article 2.1 of the DSU. It is because it is an 
action that it is not a decision and that it is not therefore adopted by consensus, 
but, in effect, automatically. Thus, we eventually see – but only after careful 
consideration of the text and context - that the DSB, introduced with much fanfare 
at the outset, in fact has nothing to say about this core issue. The same rule is re-
iterated in the same somewhat covert terms for adoption of panel and Appellate 
Body reports and countermeasures (DSU, Articles 16.4, 17.14, 22.6 and 22.7).13 
The next provision I would like to highlight in this context is Article 8 ("Composition 
of Panels"). What I find interesting about Article 8.1 is that, ostensibly, it is a rule 
requiring panellists to be "well-qualified" (a rule that one would have thought to be 
rather self-evident and not necessary to state expressly). However, if one reads on, 
in fact what one finds is a description of a very broad category of persons: including 
anyone having served on or presented a case to a panel, represented a Member, 
also in any Council or Committee, or served in the Secretariat, taught or published 
on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of any 
Member. This seems to be capable of capturing pretty much anyone that might be 
involved in the process of deciding whether or not a particular Member should 
adhere to the WTO. To me, it looks less like a meaningful description of quality, and 
more like an incentive for these persons to support adherence to the system – a 
system in which they themselves may have a (prestigious) role to play. 
I also find the choice of language to describe the Supreme Court (Appellate Body) 
(DSU, Article 17) equally low key. Furthermore, I find it intriguing that the 
Secretariat is expressly mentioned (thus justifying its subsequent role) but in the 
very last article (DSU, Article 27) and in the briefest of terms – terms that belie the 
importance of its contribution in practice. This is the hidden executive, an express 
ex ante description of which would likely not have enhanced the prospects for 
adoption of the agreement.  
Finally, and significantly, I think it is interesting to consider what is not in the DSU. 
In particular, the great majority of matters that are explored in the section of this 
paper below that relates to the way in which the rules have been used to further 
consolidate the rules based system are not apparent from the DSU. 
Thus, I am not saying that there is anything dishonest about the way the covered 
agreements and particularly the DSU are drafted. I am just saying that the ability 
to move forward at the international level is a function of being able to persuade 
enough people in key countries, such as the US, that the "slices of sovereignty" 
being ceded are minimal. Nor am I suggesting that informed observers would have 
                                                 
13 See:  Abi-Saab (2005) ("… it was done by changing one word …"); and Howse and Nicolaidis (2006) 
("Domestic deliberation of these rules is perfunctory and constrained by information and agency costs. 
This process produces a mass of general and often ambiguous rules, whose effects cannot easily be 
debated intelligently ex ante in national legislatures, and which must be accepted or rejected in a single 
package."). 
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understood these provisions incorrectly. I am just suggesting that there is evidence 
to support the view that the wheels of change – including the move to binding 
adjudication - were likely oiled at least some of the time with respect to some 
provisions and some people by the particular drafting techniques employed.14 
Further, I would suggest that this was probably done, at least in part, at the 
instigation of, or at least with the complicity of, committed multilateralists also 
within national delegations. In short, the power-based/rules-based fault line does 
not run between Members, but within them. In fact, in my experience, it is the 
defining bi-polar feature of all interactions in this area, cutting not just through 
Members, but also through institutions, delegations, departments, teams, and other 
professional or social groups. 
2. Ambiguity and discretion in WTO adjudication 
When non-lawyers, or even lawyers who do not litigate, speak about WTO law, or 
more particularly WTO adjudication, they have a tendency to think and express 
themselves as if what they are referring to is relatively homogenous. However, 
experienced litigators and judges know that the WTO adjudicative framework is far 
more complex and subtle than that. They spend a good deal of their time and 
energy – sometimes obsessively so – making what may seem to outsiders like 
arcane and esoteric distinctions between law and fact, fact and evidence, substance 
(primary rules) and procedure (secondary rules, or rules about rules), claim and 
argument, interpretation and application, and so forth. They know that cases can 
turn, or be made to turn, on the smallest detail – and heaven forbid it should be 
something they said, or didn't say, in one of their briefs. 
Thus, when one is trying to understand how or why non-legal considerations might 
percolate or permeate the WTO adjudicative process (or be excluded from it), and 
similarly when one is trying to assess whether or not a WTO judgment (and thus an 
adjudicator) has objective legal merit, it really is necessary to have a clear grasp of 
these issues. That is because, in each of the above contexts, the possibilities for 
non-legal considerations to penetrate (or be excluded from) the legal process are 
quite different. 
What does it mean to describe WTO law as "ambiguous" etc – in the pejoratively 
negative way this tends to be done? Are not some WTO legal rules so general as to 
be inherently "ambiguous" – such as good faith, or unjustified discrimination, or 
many other general principles – yet are they not, nevertheless, "good" (even 
essential) legal rules (Mitchell 2008)? Could any legal system function without such 
rules? Could a WTO judge refuse to apply a legal rule on the grounds that it is 
"ambiguous"? In cases of apparent conflict between two applicable legal rules, can 
a WTO judge refuse to apply either of them? 
What does it mean to describe a WTO judge as "active" etc. – in the pejoratively 
negative way this sometimes tends to be done? In what sense could a judge 
perform his or her functions "passively"? What is it exactly that we direct judges to 
do when we appoint them, with respect to the facts, the evidence, the procedures, 
the application of the law to the facts, and legal interpretation? Is it not, by 
definition, impossible for the legislator to perform most or all of these functions? 
Can a legal system function or even exist if these functions would not be 
performed? Who is to perform them, if not the judge? Can a criticism of "activism" 
levelled against a judgment really be distinguished from a statement that one does 
                                                 
14 In other words, if it is sometimes a puzzle to understand precisely why states bind themselves into a 
hard law adjudicative system (Abbot and Snidal 2000) perhaps sometimes part of the answer is that not 
all of the consequences were fully apparent to all of the relevant people. 
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not agree with the reasoning or outcome of the judgment? What relevance, if any, 
do such statements have for the legal system? 
These are some of the questions I would like to explore in this section. 
2.1.Different types of ambiguity in WTO law 
The concept of "ambiguity" in WTO law is a difficult one. One can sketch out 
caricatures. For example: all law is expressed in language and language is 
inherently ambiguous; thus all law is equally ambiguous; thus one might as well 
have only one legal rule - subjects of the law must act reasonably at all times. Such 
a proposition would not appear to have much if any merit in either descriptive or 
functional terms. On the other hand, having experienced both the succinct 
principled simplicity of the French style of legislative drafting as well as the Anglo 
Saxon style of extensive definitions and excessive detail that attempt to regulate all 
eventualities, and observed that both seem to generate about the same amount of 
litigation, one sometimes speculates that perhaps less is more. The moderate truth 
no doubt lies between these extremes. Given its essential ambition and function of 
regulating future conduct, law needs to be sufficiently precise in order to permit a 
sufficient number of its subjects to be able to foresee the legal consequences of 
their intended actions in a sufficient number of instances. On the other hand, 
general principles must be available to resolve marginal cases. If too many or a 
growing number of cases appear to be regulated other than by the express terms of 
the law itself, with the law itself perhaps influencing the behaviour of the subjects, 
then the law may need to be re-cast. Thus, I think the key to a law achieving an 
effective balance between being both sufficiently precise to provide legal certainty 
(DSU, Article 3.2),15 yet sufficiently general to remain relevant, is that it is based 
on past experience of the instances that its seeks to regulate, and yet is sufficiently 
flexible to adapt to changing circumstances (Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverages II).16 
Taken as a whole, I do not think that WTO law does a bad job at achieving this 
balance. If one compares, for example, the treaties establishing the EU with those 
establishing the WTO they are not entirely dissimilar in many respects. That said, I 
think there are a number of ways in which ambiguity in the WTO treaties could be 
reduced at little or no substantial cost, because some ambiguities are not in fact 
associated with political compromise (Kuijper 2003). In this respect, I recall that, 
having spent a number of years working in this area, I participated in the 
preparation of legal document containing guidance for negotiators. The gist of the 
document was to recall some of the past WTO cases in which the judicial 
construction of ambiguity had gone against the EU, and to suggest means of 
avoiding such outcomes by negotiating different treaty language in the future. The 
reception of this document among negotiators was somewhat muted, to put it 
mildly. The general sense of the reaction was that it must have been written by 
people who had never actually participated in WTO negotiations. It was then that 
the improbable realisation dawned on me. A significant amount of the time the 
negotiators were not actually trying to avoid such outcomes. Or at least they were 
taking interpretative risks, sometimes very considerable risks, because the other 
side was doing exactly the same thing, and there was no other means to conclude 
the agreement. 
                                                 
15 "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system." 
16 At page 31: "WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid or so 
inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless and ever changing 
ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world." 
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If it is not contradictory to try to be precise about ambiguity, I do think that there a 
number of things one can say about it that can help to understand how it may 
subsequently be adjudicated. 
One distinction that can be helpful, I think, is the distinction between choice, 
discretion and generality. Choice is the situation in which the Member has two or 
more options and is free to select the one that is preferred. Examples include the 
lesser duty rule in Article 9.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, or the choice 
between adopting countervailing measures under Section V and pursuing an 
actionable subsidy case under Section III of the SCM Agreement. Providing for 
choice is the best way in which negotiators can exclude an adjudicator with a very 
high degree of certainty, but it is only possible if all parties agree that the two 
options are to remain available. It does not therefore generally provide a solution in 
the case where what the parties are seeking is a political compromise. 
Discretion is the situation in which the Member is to have some discretion in 
deciding what course of action to take. The existence of discretion is often indicated 
by the use of terms such as "may". However, an adjudicator will always or almost 
always consider that any discretion is not perfectly unfettered, so the question in 
litigation will resolve itself into what the limits of such discretion might be. For 
example, it is a general principle of WTO law that a judge may draw inferences 
from a refusal by a party to answer a question (Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Aircraft, paras 202 to 203) – but the mere fact that such power is discretionary 
does not prevent parties from litigating the question of whether or not such 
discretion was correctly exercised or not in a particular case.  
Generality is the most difficult situation in which to avoid a WTO adjudicator's 
decision, especially when it is just a question of applying the law to a factual 
situation that clearly falls within the material scope of the rules in question. For 
example, Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains absolutely no rules at 
all about the identification of the period of investigation for the purposes of an 
injury analysis – it merely contains the very general rule that such analysis must be 
"objective". Nevertheless, the US successfully challenged a Mexican anti-dumping 
measure simply on the grounds that an excessive period of time had elapsed 
between the end of the investigation period and the initiation of the investigation 
(Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras 158 to 
172). In fact, WTO adjudicators frequently rely on general principles in order to 
resolve specific legal issues (Mitchell 2008). 
One particular type of ambiguity that arises quite frequently in WTO law and that 
could probably be eliminated with relatively ease is the case in which different 
terms are used to describe the same thing, or the same terms are used to describe 
different things. In the former case at least WTO adjudicators have demonstrated a 
willingness to interpret different terms as synonymous,17 no doubt reflecting their 
                                                 
17 For example, the Appellate Body has held that the terms “contingent”, “conditional”, “tied to” and 
“tie” are synonymous in the context of Articles 3.1(a) and footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement (Appellate 
Body Report, Canada – Autos, para 107); that the terms “nature of competition” and “quality of 
competition” may be considered synonymous (Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, 
paras 133 to 134); as may the terms “like” and “similar” (Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, para 91); 
and the terms “jural society”, “state” and “organized political community” (Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Dairy, para 97 and footnote 73). The Appellate Body has also found that the term “except” in 
Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is synonymous with the terms “only”, “provided 
that” and “unless” (Appellate Body Report, US-Wool Shirts and Blouses, page 9, second para and page 
16, final para.). If one looks at a frequently litigated agreement, such as the Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
one can identify many synonyms, such as for example: 1) the exporting country/the country of 
export/the supplying country/country of origin/the exporting Member 2) importing Member/the 
importing country 3) duty assessment proceedings/refund procedures 4) suppliers/producers or 
exporters 5) assurances/undertakings 6) a like product of the importing Member/the like domestic 
product 7) firms/companies 8) on-the-spot investigation/visit 9) allowance/adjustment. 
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efforts to inject some order into the sometimes chaotic drafting of the covered 
agreements. Another solution to this problem is to use definitions, something that 
the Members repeatedly asserted during the preparatory work that they were in 
favour of.18 The covered agreements do contain definitions, although often they are 
haphazardly chosen, scattered through an agreement in unlikely places, hard to 
spot, and often themselves ambiguous with respect to one or more elements of the 
definition (what is defined, what it is defined as, for what purpose, and the strength 
of the obligation to apply the definition itself).19 It is quite possible or even likely 
that, in fact, manoeuvring for political advantage has continued deep in the 
undergrowth, as it were, of such technical provisions, and this up to the last minute 
of negotiations, which explains why the texts are still not clear on such matters. 
Another type of problem that I think is closely associated with this discussion is 
what I would call the "political" decision – that is, the matter that is simply not 
susceptible to judicial review. There may be more than one example of this type of 
problem in the covered agreements, but I think that one of the most important is 
the rule under the SPS Agreement that the importing Member sets its own 
appropriate level of protection (or ALOP). In other words, absent international 
harmonisation, the ultimate decision about whether to be relatively risk oriented or 
risk averse rests with the importing Member, provided that it is fairly and even-
handedly applied, and provided that there is some element of science or rationality 
in the decision, appropriate to the circumstances (Flett 2010a). Against this 
backdrop, I think there is a very fine distinction between the fixing of the ALOP 
(from which the adjudicator is excluded) and the question of whether or not the 
measure selected is the least trade restrictive, which is expressly regulated (SPS 
Agreement, Article 5.6). 
Another significant type of problem that frequently arises is that of apparent conflict 
or tension between different provisions. Sometimes this is expressly regulated – as 
is the case for example with the General interpretative note to Annex 1A of the 
WTO Agreement, which provides that in case of conflict the GATT and the Annex 1A 
covered agreements the latter prevail to the extent of the conflict. However, 
conflicts or tensions may arise not only between agreements, but also between 
provisions and even within single provisions or sentences and phrases, and usually 
there is no express rule to deal with them. Applying an "harmonious interpretation" 
rule can help in situations where provisions do not directly contradict each other, 
but is less helpful if the provisions were obviously to approach a given problem 
from different directions. A lex specialis rule20 can also help up to a point, but often 
                                                 
18 See, for example, in the context of the preparatory work for the Anti-Dumping Agreement: 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/3, page 1 point A, page 2 point B, page 3 point H; MTN.GNG/NG8/W/7, page 1 points 
A3 and A4, page 3 point B10; MTN.GNG/NG8/W/10, page 2 point B first and second paras, page 5 point 
H;  MTN.GNG/NG8/W/11, page 2 point 11.1(2); MTN.GNG/NG8/W/12, page 1 final para; 
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/15, page 1 point II.1, page 3 first indent; MTN.GNG/NG8/4 (Note by the Secretariat), 
page 2 point 9; MTN.GNG/NG8/W/7/Rev.1 (Note by the Secretariat), paras 1, 6, 8, 9, 10, 17, 48, 49, 
50, 64, and 65 [24 instances]; MTN/GNG/NG8/W/26 (Note by the Secretariat), paras I.2, I.3, II.6, 
III.1, FN 1; MTN.GNG/NG8/7 (Note by the Secretariat), paras 4, 13 and 14; MTN.GNG/NG8/8, paras 1, 
2, 4(1), 4(2) and 5; MTN.GNG/NG8/11 (Note by the Secretariat), paras 12 and 14; MTN.GNG/NG8/13 
(Note by the Secretariat), paras 13, 16, 20, 22, 29, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 44 [12 instances]; 
MTN.GNG/NG8/15 (Note by the Secretariat), page 4 para 3, page 8 paras 2, 3 and 4, page 9 para 3, 
page 11 para 7, page 12 paras 1, 4 and 8, page 14 paras 1 and 6, page 17 para 1, page 18 para 3, 4 
and 7, page 19 paras 1, 2, 3 and 4, page 20 paras 1 and 4, page 21 paras 3 and 9, page 22 paras 1, 6 
and 7, page 23 para 3, page 28 para 4, page 30 para 3, page 32 para 2, page 33 para 4 [43 
instances]. 
19 See, for example, in the context of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the terms: dumping; margin of 
dumping; injury; domestic industry; like product; interested parties; authorities; initiated; and levy 
(Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994; Articles 2.6, 4.1, 6.11 and footnotes 1, 3, 9 and 12 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement). 
20 “The maxim lex specialis derogate legi generali is a generally accepted technique of interpretation and 
conflict resolution in international law.” (International Law Commission 2006). Ibid, footnote 2: “For 
application in relation to provisions within a single treaty, see Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. 
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it may be difficult to know which provision is the more specific. In fact, many of the 
covered agreements regulate matters at a relatively high degree of abstraction – 
often the drafters are familiar with their own legislation on the relevant subject and 
sometimes seem to forget that future readers may not be. Consequently, one often 
finds an obligation in one place counterbalanced by a right somewhere else. A 
considerable part of the subsequent activity of WTO adjudicators involves finding a 
rational and reasonable balance between such provisions in the context of a 
particular dispute, which is a delicate combination of interpretation of the law and 
application of the law to the facts. 
The situation with respect to preambles is also interesting. Object and purpose is 
one element of the interpretative rule in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, 
and one of the obvious places to look is the preamble of the relevant agreement. 
Unfortunately, one often finds nebulous or all encompassing language capable of 
supporting either side of the debate. In some cases, there are even no recitals at all 
– as in the case of the Anti-Dumping Agreement – essentially because it is 
fundamentally irrational. Often that leads adjudicators to look at the overall design 
and architecture of the relevant agreement instead, so that a consideration of 
object and purpose merges into a consideration of context. Also quite often 
adjudicators narrow the scope of their assessment to looking at the object and 
purpose of a particular provision, rather than the agreement as a whole.   
Another area that often causes difficulty is rules about the future or rules that 
otherwise lead to the need to posit a hypothetical. No one can know what the 
future holds and this is as true for lawyers as it is for anyone else. Thus, to frame a 
legal rule in such terms does cast an extremely heavy burden onto the judge. It 
often leads to excessively detailed analysis as the judge struggles to frame the 
assessment in objective terms. It also often leads to a heavy involvement of 
economists and an associated "battle of experts" that experience demonstrates 
does not necessarily assist the judge in reaching an objective conclusion. Examples 
of such rules applied at domestic level and reviewed in the WTO include rules about 
threat of injury (Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 3.7, SCM Agreement, Article 
15.7) (applications of which have not tended to be well-received) and sunset 
reviews (Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 11.3, SCM Agreement, Article 21.3) 
(which have fared better). Examples of such rules that have to be applied directly 
at the level of the WTO would include market benchmarks or certain types of 
adverse effects under the SCM Agreement (SCM Agreement, Articles 14 and 
6.3(c)). A particularly fascinating example arises under the SPS Agreement when 
scientists are asked to advise panels and the science on a particular matter is not 
cast in terms of repeatable and observable experiment, but rather in terms of 
hypothesis. 
Finally, another area that I think worth briefly mentioning is the problem of 
different language versions. Most litigation (but not all) occurs in English, but the 
agreements are authentic in English, French and Spanish, (WTO Agreement, Article 
XVI:6) and the reports are translated into all languages.  Sometimes there are 
differences between the text of the covered agreements – a matter that is also 
regulated by Article 33 of the Vienna Convention. In my view, this is a type of 
ambiguity that it ought to be reasonably easy to eliminate simply be ensuring a 
proper linguistic review prior to legislation being finally adopted. 
                                                                                                                                               
Chile) ILR vol. 52 (1979) p. 141, paras. 36, 38 and 39; Case C-96/00, Rudolf Gabriel, Judgment of 11 
July 2002, ECR (2002) I-06367, pp. 6398-6399, paras. 35-36 and p. 6404, para. 59; Brannigan and 
McBride v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 May 1993, ECHR Series A (1993) No. 258, p. 57, para. 
76; De Jong, Baljet and van den Brink v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 22 May 1984, ECHR Series A 
(1984) No. 77, p. 27, para. 60; Murray v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 October 1994, ECHR 
Series A (1994) No. 300, p. 37, para. 98 and Nikolova v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 25 March 1999, ECHR 
1999-II, p. 25, para. 69.”. 
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To conclude, my purpose in this section has not been to set out exhaustively the 
different types of "ambiguity" that can arise in WTO law. However, the point that I 
would like to make is that one often hears the debate about the interface between 
politics and law in the context of adjudication being couched in simplistic terms, as 
if there would be only one type of "ambiguity". This rather reminds me of the way 
people sometimes speak about "sovereignty" in simple or homogenous terms, 
whereas we all know it is a much more complex and subtle matter than that. I think 
the problem of ambiguity in WTO law is much the same – as I have tried to indicate 
in this section, I think it is multifaceted. Thus, if one wants to understand and 
critique what is going on in general terms, I think one really has to understand and 
be able to critique what is going on in particular instances, and I think that part of 
being able to do that involves being able to distinguish between and understand 
different types of ambiguity. 
2.2.Different types of discretion in WTO adjudication 
Having tried to demonstrate that, looking at one side of the process (the process of 
legislation) there are different types of ambiguity, and that understanding this is a 
necessary part of critiquing what is going on, I would now like to briefly consider 
the other side of the process (that is, the process of adjudication). Essentially, the 
point I would like to make is the same. WTO adjudication is not a simple or 
homogenous process – it is complex and multifaceted. In fact, I would say that it is 
almost obsessive in its de-construction of disputes into their constituent parts. Far 
more so that has been my experience before domestic courts or the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. I suspect the reason for this is because the Membership of 
the WTO is so diverse, so WTO adjudicators are very well aware that there is no 
easy short cut to justice on the basis of shared values. The legitimacy of their 
judgments rests almost uniquely on the exhaustiveness and rigour of the analysis. 
Thus, if one wants to understand and critique what is going on in general terms in 
WTO adjudication, I think one really has to understand and be able to critique what 
is going on in particular instances, and I think that part of being able to do that 
involves being able to distinguish between and understand the different aspects of 
a judgment. 
2.2.1.Facts 
Every judgment necessarily floats in an ocean of assumed facts. The truth of this 
proposition will be immediately recognised by any parent who has played the "why" 
game with their child. Each explanation elicits the re-iterated uncritical cost-free 
question, until the patience of the parent fails, with the inevitable final response 
"because". The process must have its limits, because it cannot be that one must 
decide (or explain) everything before one can decide (or explain) anything. A WTO 
judge is not a philosopher; he or she is there to adjudicate on a real world dispute. 
Thus, separating facts that can be assumed from facts that need to be found, even 
if only implicitly, is, by definition, an inherent part of WTO judicial activity.  
The phenomenon appears most clearly in cases where there is no municipal 
measure accompanied by an administrative "record" purporting to establish the 
facts. It is particularly in such cases that the unfathomed sea of knowledge 
potentially relevant to the dispute is readily apparent. One thinks, for example, of 
alleged undue delay under the SPS Agreement. Complaining Members in such cases 
often try to use the consultation process to fix a closed list of documents that will 
form the basis for the dispute; and defending Members generally resist that, 
because what documents may be relevant really depends on how many re-
iterations of questioning the complaining Member and the WTO adjudicator will 
eventually introduce. However, the observation is also true in cases where there is 
such an administrative record, such as, for example, anti-dumping or countervailing 
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duty cases, such administrative record itself similarly floating in an ocean of 
assumed facts. 
I am referring here to something other than the facts that are asserted and/or 
found. Naturally, some facts will have to be asserted by the complaining party in 
order to make its case; and some facts may also have to be asserted by the 
defending party in order to make its defence. If not properly contested (by asserted 
counter-fact and adduced evidence and explanation) asserted facts, at least when 
referenced in the judgment, are effectively found by the judge, rather than 
assumed. As in other jurisdictions, in the WTO there are procedural limitations 
relating to the establishment of the facts – for example facts cannot generally be 
asserted or contested for the first time on appeal. However, even leaving aside 
these procedural limitations, and even leaving aside the submissions of the parties, 
some facts are so "self-evident" in the context of particular proceedings that they 
are adequately dealt with through a process of assumption. 
Accordingly, every WTO judge, by definition, has a significant degree of "discretion" 
when sketching out the factual base of the pyramid, at the apex of which will stand 
the adjudication of the dispute.  
2.2.2.Evidence 
Turning to the question of evidence, judges, and particularly WTO judges, do not, 
indeed cannot, directly sense the relevant facts. Like everyone else involved in the 
case, they must attempt to perceive reality largely through the evidence placed 
before them, almost always in the form of written documents. This is a formidable 
task. The task is that much more difficult in the area of economic law for several 
reasons. First, the "evidence" is almost always incomplete or conflicting. Second, it 
rarely brings one into immediate proximity with the facts, in the sense that the 
document adduced in evidence is in the nature of a "first impression" from the 
facts, as one might consider a photograph to be. Rather, the document typically 
refers to other documents or concepts, and will need to be carefully considered by 
the judge, together with all the evidence, in order to build up a reasonably reliable 
picture of the facts. Third, such documents are rarely free from legal 
characterisations of the facts. One might say that, in economic law litigation, there 
are no facts, only evidence. 
The WTO judge must "weigh the evidence", taking into account authenticity (rarely 
expressly questioned since that would suggest a lack of good faith by the party 
adducing the evidence - Appellate Body Report, US-Continued Zeroing, para. 340), 
relevance of the asserted fact, persuasiveness (including the stature and interests 
of the person originating the evidence) and the way the evidence fits or conflicts 
with the other evidence. Thus, in weighing the evidence, and particularly in 
preferring one piece of evidence over some other conflicting evidence, the WTO 
judge is also necessarily exercising a significant degree of "discretion". 
2.2.3.Procedures 
Turning to the question of procedures, one may observe that, in one sense, all law, 
or at least all litigation, is procedural, in the sense that the ultimate litigator's truth 
is a procedural one: the judge has decided and the judgement is binding. No matter 
how right a party might be on the facts or even the law, if procedurally absent or 
deficient, that party risks an adverse or default judgment. 
This is one area in which I think the notion of judicial "activism" and criticism of it 
makes sense.  Litigation is in the nature of a contest or game that the parties agree 
beforehand will be conducted according to certain rules and the outcome of which 
will be binding. Most obviously, the parties agree to defer the use of unilateral force 
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until such time that they might seek to induce compliance with the judgment. Since 
the unfettered expression of opinion can in certain circumstances be likened to the 
exercise of power, this necessarily implies control of the process, particularly 
through alternate written and oral pleadings within specified time limits. Parties 
never speak simultaneously in hearings. The very concept of allowing each party to 
have their say necessarily implies that the case is made, in factual, evidential and 
legal terms, and that each party has the opportunity to defend or rebut. That in 
turn necessarily implies that the jurisdiction of the judge is restricted to 
adjudicating the dispute actually put before the court by the parties. To the extent 
the judge would do otherwise, he or she would be offering an "advisory opinion" not 
requested by the parties for the purposes of resolving their dispute. I think that this 
type of activity, detached from the actual resolution of a dispute, could be likened 
to legislative activity, insofar as it has no value other than with respect to future 
cases that are yet to arise. It might therefore reasonably be described as "judicial 
activism".21 
Obviously, the problem is particularly acute with respect to the legal aspects of a 
case. This is a point on which the WTO has reasonably well-developed rules. A WTO 
judge does not have jurisdiction to consider legal claims or arguments parties have 
not made. There is more flexibility with respect to facts and evidence, reflecting the 
reality that, within a defined legal framework, a case may reasonably develop from 
a factual and evidential point of view, as the essential elements of the dispute are 
refined in the pleadings. However, here too, there is a real risk that a judge might 
teleologically solicit facts and evidence with a particular legal outcome in mind, and 
in my view WTO procedures would, in this respect, benefit from increased rigour.   
2.2.4.Distinguishing law and fact and applying law to fact 
I would like to turn now to the judicial processes by which law and fact are 
distinguished and law applied to fact.  
All language is categorical. We use words as labels to express and communicate 
what we repeatedly sense. No two sense-events, accompanied by the word, are 
identical, but they are similar enough that, over time, the meaning of the word 
develops from one that is specific to a particular sense-event to one that is 
categorical. One sees this very clearly in the way a child learns its first language by 
repeatedly pointing at an object and intimating that it wishes the word associated 
with that object to be spoken. After a number of repetitions, the child grasps the 
essential characteristics of the category, rapidly assimilating quite subtle if 
imperfect distinctions; begins to use those words itself when pointing (thus, itself 
placing the sensed object within the relevant category); and eventually uses those 
words even in the absence of the object – that is, in a categorical manner, 
detached from any sense-event. 
There is nothing absolute about these categories. They simply encapsulate a set of 
different but sufficiently similar sense-events. Further, the content of the same 
category is necessarily different for each individual. In effect, we all speak our own 
private language. Languages may be designed or develop in such a manner that, in 
the real world, we generally manage to understand each other well enough, enough 
of the time, to achieve whatever objective we have in seeking to communicate. 
Nevertheless – and this is the point – it is impossible to eliminate the "ambiguity" 
                                                 
21 For example, in Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US) the Panel construed the DSU as 
providing for ex tunc remedies despite the fact that the parties agreed that the remedy was ex nunc. 
Leaving aside the substantive merits of the Panel's assessment, unless one considers this a matter that 
a panel may address of its own motion, which seems difficult to argue, then this does look like a case of 
judicial "activism", and certainly the parties complained to that effect in the DSB minutes. 
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associated with categorical language because, by definition, it is impossible for us 
to experience another individual's experience. 
WTO law, like any other, is obviously categorical. However, what is not always so 
clearly understood is that facts asserted before a WTO court, like any other, are 
generally also categorical, in the sense that the judge does not directly experience 
the asserted fact. Thus, when a WTO judge applies the law to a given fact, what the 
judge is doing is comparing two categories. 
The essential difference between the law-category and the fact-category is that, 
leaving aside the particular matter of retroactive laws, the law-category is forward 
looking, in the sense that it is designed to catch (or exclude) facts that are yet to 
occur when the law is enacted; whilst the fact-category is backward looking, in the 
sense that it refers to past events. If the asserted facts have not yet occurred there 
is no dispute to adjudicate. A state in which the law-category is only backward 
looking is not a state of law, but a state of despotism. The very essence of law and 
its essential social function is the provision of a framework for future events, giving 
members of society the security and predictability to interact with knowledge of the 
consequences. The point is not that one must necessarily have a different individual 
performing the legislative (forward looking) function and the judicial (backward 
looking) function (as in classic constitutional division of powers theory). The point is 
that, it follows from the essence of law that these are, by definition, different and 
distinct functions that it is impossible to merge (even if performed by the same 
individual at different times). 
The essential thing about two different categories – and pretty much all one can 
say about them in general terms (with the possible exception of numbers) – is that 
they are different. One can see the truth of this observation in a discussion of two 
issues commonly arising in the WTO context. 
The first is the type of statement one hears quite often from WTO Members to the 
effect that their laws are "WTO-plus". In fact, they are just different. With a little 
imagination, it is generally always possible to envisage a case within the municipal 
law that would nevertheless be WTO inconsistent. Thus, the truth is that the WTO 
consistency of a law may depend more on how it is interpreted and applied in a 
particular case, than the manner in which it is framed. And experience suggests 
that when such laws, particularly as interpreted and applied in particular cases, are 
actually put to the test of WTO litigation, they are frequently found wanting. 
The second is the related discussion of the so-called "mandatory/discretionary" 
distinction, according to which, if a municipal law could be interpreted and applied 
in a WTO consistent manner, it is "as such" WTO consistent. This proposition is 
obviously flawed, and certainly in the absence of any operational interpretation in 
conformity rule in municipal law. For example, if a municipal anti-dumping law 
provides that, having calculated a margin of dumping, an importing Member may 
either apply an anti-dumping duty equivalent to the margin of dumping or an anti-
dumping duty double the margin of dumping, it is no defence to invoke the first 
option to argue that the law is "as such" WTO consistent. For this reason, the 
Appellate Body has effectively and correctly consigned the mandatory/discretion 
doctrine to history, in ruling that it should not be "mechanistically" applied – the 
very essence of the doctrine being its mechanistic application (Bhuiyan 2002, Naiki 
2004, Flett, 2005). 
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Thus, to conclude on this section, also in the processes of distinguishing law and 
fact and applying law to fact there are ambiguities that cannot, by definition, be 
resolved by the legislator, and can only, by definition, be addressed by a judge. 
2.2.5.Interpretation 
The final matter that I would like to consider in this section relates to the process of 
interpretation of WTO law. I will be relatively brief because I return to this issue 
below, and because quite a lot has been written by others on this matter (Van 
Damme 2009). The main observation that I would like to make here is as follows. 
When power-based interests sometimes criticise the rules-based output of the WTO 
adjudication system one often hears the criticisms couched in terms of alleged 
abuse of the interpretative process. However, oddly enough, I do not think that it is 
in the rules of interpretation that one finds the greatest degree of potential judicial 
"wiggle room" as it were. I think this is particularly so in the case of the WTO 
because of the tendency to draw upon the Vienna Convention to provide a 
systematic framework for the process of interpretation. Thus, when one hears such 
criticisms, in reality what one is generally hearing are criticisms of aspects of the 
process that are common to all judicial systems (such as the weighing of the 
evidence), and such criticisms are usually driven simply by an adverse outcome in a 
particular case.    
Thus, in my view, a great deal of the game in litigation is in fact played out in other 
parts of the arena (that is, apart from the arena of legal interpretation). To put it 
bluntly, in my experience, a hostile judge, and particularly (but not only) one 
subject to appeal, will not try to "stitch up" a particular litigant on the law – 
something that an effective advocate should be able to preclude in any event. 
Rather, they will do it in other parts of the process. However, and this is a very 
important point, litigants do have the possibility to substantially control and 
constrain that process. That is why one of the most fundamental aspects of the 
exercise is due process – because as long as one is given the opportunity one can 
deal with the problem – and one of the most distinctive hallmarks of a bad 
judgment is that it contains surprises for one or both litigants. It is also why, once 
one has established the facts and reviewed the evidence and the law, one generally 
has a very good idea about how the judge will decide. The two areas that I would 
identify as the most difficult for a litigant to control in advance are applying the law 
to the facts (because of the inherent difficulty of comparing two categories) and 
(probably more important) the weighing of conflicting evidence. 
To conclude on this section, I hope I have managed to explain how the way in 
which non-legal considerations might (or might not) penetrate a WTO legal analysis 
is not a simple matter, but complex and multifaceted. I hope I have also been able 
to explain that, in my view, the main potential point of entry, as it were, is not the 
rules of interpretation, at least in the WTO. Furthermore, I hope I have been able to 
explain that such possibilities as exist for directing the post-legislative process 
generally flow from ambiguities embedded in the legislation and not from the 
adjudicative process itself. In other words, responsibility for not only the 
emergence but also the development of the WTO rules-based system rests with the 
politicians, which is how matters should be. One cannot criticise the lawyers for 
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3. Clarifying ambiguity and exercising discretion to build a rules-based 
operating system 
In my experience the frontier between power and rules is never really stable. It is 
rather like a disputed international boundary, where neither party is happy with 
what they have got, and both are convinced that the other has more than they 
should have. From time-to-time trouble flares up: there is an incursion or one fires 
a salvo into the other's territory. And always in the background there is a threat of 
a wider conflict, potentially disastrous to the interests of both. However, with the 
passage of time there is always the hope that things settle down and that 
eventually both sides acquire the habits of co-existence. 
What I would like to do in this section is pick out and analyse some of those 
instances or issues in WTO adjudication where the power-based and rules-based 
views of the world have actually met each other in specific circumstances. In doing 
so, I would like to focus on what one might call the symbols of a court – that is, 
those things that distinguish a particular activity as judicial in nature. I think it 
emerges from this discussion – and the observation is perhaps not surprising – that 
over time the WTO dispute settlement system and particularly the Appellate Body 
has gradually being consolidating the rules-based approach. There are, however, a 
couple of areas where the process is not yet stable, including the selection of 
adjudicators and the availability of effective remedies. 
3.1.Selecting the Judges 
As already indicated, the selection of judges is one area where I think that the WTO 
dispute settlement system has yet to fully develop from a rules-based point of 
view. 
If one looks at Article 8 of the DSU, which regulates panel composition, I think its 
main contours are clear. Panels are to be well-qualified, independent and balanced; 
citizens of parties and third parties are excluded unless the parties agree otherwise; 
names are drawn from an indicative list maintained by the Secretariat; there are 
three panellists (unless the parties agree to five); the Secretariat nominates and 
parties may only oppose for a compelling reason; absent agreement within 20 days 
the Director-General composes; a developing country litigant gets at least one 
panellist from a developing country on request; and expenses are met from the 
WTO budget. Thus, the two critical powers or responsibilities (nomination and final 
composition) rest with the WTO institutions. 
In practice something rather different has been happening. First, the Secretariat 
asks the parties to express their views about general criteria. This is odd, since the 
criteria are already set out in Article 8. Typically, the parties may try to make this 
process work to their advantage. For example, in litigation there is often one party 
that is taking what is fundamentally a more "legalistic" approach to a given 
problem, whilst the other is taking what is fundamentally a more "economic" 
approach. Obviously, the first party will seek lawyers on the panel, whilst the 
second will seek economists. Second, and probably most significantly, the 
Secretariat generally nominates six names for a panel of three. In my view this is 
not consistent with the provisions of Article 8, which indicate three panellists and 
provide for the Secretariat to make nominations for the panel. The particular 
consequence of this is that the parties tend to be driven to express a preference, 
which develops into a tendency to invent a compelling reason to object, even if 
none really exists. Third, and also significantly, the Secretariat has adopted the 
habit of inviting the parties to a meeting to express their views. This facilitates the 
expression of spurious compelling reasons because there is usually no written 
record. Fourth, as already indicated, the parties tend to invent compelling reasons 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 20 
Jamen Flett   Fron the Green Room 
 
that are in reality utterly spurious. Fifth, some Members consider the process 
"confidential", even though there is no rule to that effect in the DSU, and on the 
contrary one may reasonably and in my view correctly argue that a defect in panel 
composition is a matter that can be raised before a panel and eventually before the 
Appellate Body. Sixth, a situation has developed in which some Members no longer 
even bother expressing a compelling reason, but merely say that they are "still 
considering" the nomination and ask for a new set of proposals. Thus, in effect, 
such Members are just flicking through the list until they reach their preferred 
name. And a very real part of the problem is that they appear to be looking at 
potential adjudicators not by reference to their objective qualities as an adjudicator, 
but rather by reference to whether or not they might be inclined to favour the 
arguments of that Member. Seventh, if one does go to the Director-General 
experience suggests that he or she may be reluctant to appoint anyone to whom 
one of the parties has objected. 
Thus, if one looks at what the rules provide, and what is actually happening, the 
two things are worlds apart and in my view this is having a number of negative 
consequences. First, there is an excessive emphasis on individuals, as opposed to 
their objective qualities as adjudicators, as if it would be a good thing for anyone if 
the case would be won because of a panellist's pre-conceived ideas as opposed to 
the objective merits of the legal arguments. Second, if the quality of the panel 
report is inadequate, this puts an excessive amount of pressure on the Appellate 
Body and unnecessarily stresses the system. Third, I have the impression that it 
may be increasingly difficult to find good quality panellists willing to subject 
themselves to this sort of process (I believe that their availability generally has to 
be checked before their names are put forward). Fourth, I also have the impression 
that sometimes Members actually seek weak panellists if they believe that to be in 
their interests in a particular case, something that in my view cannot be in the 
interests of the system. Fifth, I also sometimes have the impression that the 
Secretariat itself proposes names that it knows the parties will never agree to, 
simply because it is withholding its real selection until one of the parties goes to the 
Director-General. 
In my view, what should be happening is a written proposal for three, preferably 
from the indicative list; any objections should be required to be in writing; and in 
the exercise of his or her discretion the Director-General should not hesitate to 
overrule spurious compelling objections and proceed with the composition as 
originally proposed. 
I do not think that the Secretariat is entirely free from responsibility for the current 
state of affairs. Apart from allowing the centre of gravity of the process to drift 
away from the institution and back to the litigating parties, I sometimes have the 
impression that their approach to this problem is somewhat ambivalent. One does 
sometimes have the impression that the role of the Secretariat in advising panels is 
important, and given the ambiguities in the covered agreements this sometimes 
means that the Secretariat is acting almost as a hidden executive. In this situation, 
the temptation may sometimes be there to prefer weak panellists, which I do not 
believe is in the long term interests of the system. Furthermore, returning the 
process to its proper balance would require that the Secretariat and the Director-
General properly exercise their powers as responsibilities. There are very few areas 
indeed in which the covered agreements specifically create what is in effect an 
institutional role for the Secretariat and the Director-General, and if even these are 
not correctly fulfilled then one may hardly expect that a more important and 
proactive role for the executive might develop. Thus, in making nominations the 
Secretariat itself must pay special attention to the objective qualities of persons as 
adjudicators, and avoid the temptation of proposing people simply because their 
known views happen to correspond to those of the Secretariat, or of excluding 
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others simply because in some past case they preferred to depart from the advice 
given by the Secretariat. 
Finally, there is an interesting issue about the chair. The DSU itself does not refer 
to a panel having a chair, although it is probably reasonable that at least for the 
conduct of procedural matters, especially hearings, there should be one. In practice 
the chair, although equal with the other panellists in theory at least on matters of 
substance, appears to play a more developed role. Thus, it is interesting that the 
Secretariat has adopted the practice of itself making specific proposals as to who 
should be the chair (usually two of the six names proposed), as opposed to allowing 
the panel itself to determine this matter once composed (as happens with an 
Appellate Body division) (Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Rule 7.1). This 
probably enhances the influence of the Secretariat. 
Some of these issues have bubbled to the surface in litigation. For example, in the 
US-Upland Cotton case the parties originally agreed that the panel could include 
two citizens of the third parties. At the compliance panel stage the US purported to 
re-invoke the provisions of Article 8.3 of the DSU in order to remove them and, 
remarkably, the Secretariat acquiesced in that. Brazil complained in the DSB and 
the US counter-complained about an alleged breach of confidentiality.22 No doubt 
not wishing to provoke the new panellists Brazil did not raise the issue in the 
litigation, although the EU did as third party – although as third party its 
observations were not taken up by the panel or Appellate Body (Panel Report, US-
Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), paras 8.27 to 8.28 and footnote 83, Appellate 
Body Report, US-Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 171). The gambit does 
not seem to have assisted the US and may even have worked against it, given the 
findings in the compliance panel reports. 
Similarly, in the US-Zeroing case, in what was in my view an ill-conceived 
approach, the panel was composed of one EU and one US panellist with a chair 
from New Zealand. There was a dissenting opinion in favour of the EU which, 
although anonymous, is widely assumed to have been authored by the EU panellist. 
At the compliance stage only the EU panellist was still available, so once again the 
US removed him supposedly on grounds of citizenship and the Secretariat 
acquiesced in that. The EU complained unsuccessfully to the panel and Appellate 
Body not because it was attempting to revive "its" panellist, but because, as a 
matter of principle, it did not agree that adjudicators could be removed in this way 
during the process by one of the parties (Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC) 
(Article 21.5 – EC), paras 164 to 172). 
It remains to be seen how this issue develops. I am not suggesting that the issue of 
whether or not a particular reason is compelling could or should be frequently 
litigated before the Appellate Body. But I am suggesting that the Secretariat and 
the Director-General could and should interpret and apply the rules correctly; that if 
they did so it would be very unlikely that the Member invoking the overruled 
compelling reason would appeal; and that in order to get the Secretariat and 
Director-General to move in the right direction a substantial poke from a more 
rules-based perspective – that is, from the Appellate Body - may do the trick. The 
interesting issue that might arise is the situation where only three proposals 
remain, agreed to by one party, but the response of the other party is that it is "still 
considering" one or more of the proposals. In that situation, in my view, absent any 
reasons let alone a compelling reason, the panel is composed, and any different 
                                                 
22 Minutes of the DSB Meeting on 26 October 2006 (WT/DSB/M/221), paras 75 to 79; Minutes of the 
DSB meeting on 21 November 2009 (WT/DSB/M/222), paras 82 to 89; Minutes of the DSB Meeting on 
19 December 2006 (WT/DSB/M/224), paras 59 to 67. 
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composition would entail a legal defect justifying subsequent reversal of the panel 
report. 
Thus, my conclusion would be that, on this issue, the rules are not yet being 
interpreted and applied so as to consolidate and enhance the rules-based system, 
most likely because the Appellate Body is infrequently involved. I do not, however, 
see any reason why this should not change, and my hope and expectation is that it 
eventually will. 
3.2.Administrative Support 
The next issue I would like to briefly comment on relates to the role of the 
Secretariat. A rules-bases system cannot work without a judge and all judges 
cannot work all of the time without some assistance. It is significant that the DSU 
expressly refers to the "responsibilities" of the Secretariat (DSU, Article 27.1) (an 
interesting choice of words – perhaps no-one would wish to suggest that the 
Secretariat has "powers"). However, the extremely brief and weak drafting of this 
provision belies the important role of the Secretariat in litigation. There was a rare 
glimpse of this on one occasion when two draft panel reports appeared with 
essentially identical drafting, indicating the extent to which the Secretariat is 
involved in individual cases. 
Another interesting point here is that the secretariat assistance to panels originates 
from different parts of the WTO according to the type of dispute. Thus, anti-
dumping and subsidies cases in particular are assisted by the so-called "rules 
division" of the WTO, whilst other cases are assisted by the "legal affairs" division. 
The reason for this split is not entirely clear.  
But the main point that I think is of interest here is the position with respect to the 
Appellate Body. Article 17.7 of the DSU provides only that the Appellate Body shall 
be provided with appropriate administrative and legal support as it requires. In 
principle, nothing would appear to exclude the possibility that this support could be 
drawn from the general secretariat. However, the Appellate Body has its own 
secretariat that, although in the same building, is tightly separated from the rest of 
the organisation. I think this has probably played an important ancillary role in the 
development of WTO jurisprudence. One has the impression that members of the 
general secretariat, who may in fact be in regular contact with Members on other 
issues, are to some extent more influenced by the practice of Members. On the 
other hand, members of the Appellate Body secretariat appear to be more 
influenced by the objective rules of interpretation. In short, I think that the 
establishment of its own secretariat has probably been an important factor in the 
development by the Appellate Body of a more rules-based system. 
3.3.Rules of Procedure 
The next point I would like to discuss concerns the rules of procedure. I think that 
rules of procedure are one of the essential badges of a court in a rule-based 
system. Of course the DSU itself constitutes in substantial measure the rules of 
procedure. However, Appendix 3 of the DSU contains model working procedures for 
panels, and Article 17.9 of the DSU provides for the Appellate Body to adopt its own 
working procedures. 
There is an interesting legal question about the relationship between such working 
procedures and the DSU itself. The conventional wisdom, which I think is correct, 
appears to be that one can do more or less anything in the working procedures, 
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provided that one stays within the material scope of the DSU, and at the same time 
does not contradict anything in the DSU. 
The model panel working procedures in Appendix 3 of the DSU are relatively short. 
They tend to get adapted according to the needs of particular cases, and it is 
notably that there has as yet been no attempt by the Secretariat to consolidate 
these various adaptations into a more elaborate standard model. Interesting issues 
however often arise. 
One such issue, for example, is the problem of "executive summaries". This may 
appear to be a trivial matter, but there is rather more to it that meets the eye. 
Appendix 3 does not refer to executive summaries. However, it is a standard 
insertion by panels (that is, the Secretariat) to either ask or even require the 
parties and third parties to provide "executive summaries". One hopes that the 
reason for this is not that the panellists do not read the submissions – although one 
should recall that they are ad hoc part-timers and that sometimes submissions are 
several hundred pages long. Rather, the reason appears to be to facilitate the 
preparation of panel reports. I am not certain that this is an entirely desirable 
thing. One does tend to notice two basic types of report – the type in which the 
parties' submissions are consecutively summarised by cutting and pasting the 
executive summaries, and the type in which a single summary for each party has 
been prepared by the panel (that is, by the secretariat). I am not particularly 
impressed by the first type, recalling the somewhat cynical definition of a university 
lecture as a means of getting information from the notes of the lecturer to the 
notes of the students without passing through the minds of either. A linked 
question is whether the panel can require executive summaries, and what it might 
do if a party or third party refused to provide them. I tend to think that the panel 
would not be in a position to draw adverse inferences or exclude submissions. This 
discussion is also linked to the issue of translation (some early reports annexed and 
translated the parties' submissions) and delay in the issuance of panel reports 
(recalling the various time limits in the DSU). In my view, in order to get at the 
root of this problem, it would probably be necessary to restrict the length of parties' 
submissions, something that is common in other courts and that I think can and 
should be done under the DSU as it stands. In turn, it would probably be necessary 
to create an environment in which parties felt confident about restricting their 
claims to the core issues. That could be done, for example, by facilitating the 
addition of claims during the proceedings should that prove appropriate (subject to 
due process), by having an expansive notion of compliance proceedings, and by 
ensuring that retaliation is assessed by reference to the measure as a whole (US-
Gambling Article 22.6 Arbitration Panel Report, anonymous individual opinion). 
Another interesting issue that has arisen concerns so-called business confidential 
information (BCI). The basic tension here is between the desire of firms to have 
their data protected even when it is referenced in litigation, and the proposition 
that the final judgment should be comprehensible and accessible to all Members, 
and indeed the wider public (Appellate Body Report, Japan-Drams, paras 106 and 
279). There is nothing in Appendix III on this issue and special working procedures 
are adopted from time-to-time, notwithstanding the fact that the DSU provides 
more generally for confidentiality. There are different circles of confidentiality. In its 
most extreme form, sometimes parties refuse to even provide information to panels 
– an approach that, fortunately, is generally not fruitful for them. Then there is the 
question of other parties – here the general approach is to require the other party 
to keep the information confidential and in particular not disclose it to any 
employee or agent of a competitor. Then there is the question of third parties – 
here from time-to-time third parties are excluded from but may fight for access to 
BCI information. Finally, there is the question of the final report – and here some 
reports have in my view suffered from excessive bracketing, although the Appellate 
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Body would rather seem to be of the view that it should generally be possible to 
draft without express reference to BCI (DSU, Article 18.1). In general, the Appellate 
Body appears to strike the balance much more in the direction of openness – that 
is, the rules-based system – rather than confidentiality, and rightly so in my view. 
Another interesting question that has arisen is the question of open hearings and 
the associated additional working procedures – but this matter is discussed in more 
detail below. 
It is interesting to compare the flexible and somewhat messy situation with respect 
to panel working procedures with the situation in the Appellate Body. Article 17.9 of 
the DSU provides that working procedures for appellate review shall be drawn up 
by the Appellate Body. In itself this constitutes a remarkable power. The 
possibilities for secondary rule making in the WTO are extremely limited, and even 
more so when they are constrained only by a "soft" requirement of consultation 
with the Chairman of the DSB and mere "communication" to Members for their 
information. To some extent this may be seen as a compensation for the fact that 
the DSU contains only one article (Article 17) that relates specifically to the 
Appellate Body – which is remarkable given its importance within the overall 
system. 
The Working Procedures for Appellate Review (WT/AB/WP/6*) is an impressive 
document by any measure. Almost 9,000 words long it is almost as long as the DSU 
itself (which is about 11,500 words long). It is eminently legalistic in its drafting – 
the first Article contains 25 definitions. It regulates a whole range of issues, 
including: the duties and responsibilities of Appellate Body Members; decision-
making; collegiality; the election and role of the Chairman of the Appellate Body; 
the constitution of divisions; the election and role of the presiding Member of the 
division; rules of conduct; incapacity; replacement; resignation; transition; general 
process; documents; ex parte communications; commencement of appeals; 
appellant submissions; appellee submissions; multiple appeals; amending notices of 
appeal; third participants; transmittal of the record; working schedules; oral 
hearings; written responses; failure to appear; withdrawal of appeals; prohibited 
subsidies; entry into force and amendment; and timetables. Thus, the Appellate 
Body appears to have taken full advantage of the power afforded to it by Article 
17.9 of the DSU, and has included under the relatively nebulous heading "working 
procedures" matters that are also of an institutional or even constitutional nature. 
There is no doubt that there are a number of provisions in this document that, in 
themselves, make an important contribution to the rules-based system. For 
example, Rule 4 on collegiality provides for an exchange between all seven 
Members before the three Members of the division decide a case. Rule 6 provides 
for the selection of a division on the basis of rotation, while taking into account the 
principles of random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to 
serve regardless of their national origin. Rule 18 provides that no document is 
considered filed unless received within the specified time-period. And so forth. From 
time-to-time the Appellate Body amends the Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review and there are also "soft" additional procedures for consultations adopted by 
the DSB (WT/DSB/31). These discussions always attract very close attention from 
the Members, particularly those frequently engaged in litigation, because they well 
understand that very small changes in the rules can have substantial and important 
consequences in the operation of the system, both in general terms and in the 
context of specific cases (Alvarez-Jimenez 2009). 
Finally, a further notable feature of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review is 
that they provide in rule 16.1 that, where a procedural question arises that is not 
covered by those rules, a division may adopt an appropriate procedure for the 
purposes of that appeal only, provided that it is not inconsistent with the DSU, the 
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other covered agreements and those rules. This can be seen just as a reservation 
of the possibility of acting quickly on an ad hoc basis in a particular case should 
that prove necessary. However, it also confirms the general proposition that the 
adjudicator is free to do what is not precluded (even if not expressly authorised by 
the DSU), which is a key point, and central to understanding, for example, the 
discussion with respect to amicus curiae briefs (see further below). 
3.4.Rules of Interpretation 
One of the most important and earliest issues relates to the applicable rules of 
interpretation. I think that non-lawyers often tend to characterise WTO adjudicators 
as exercising power, whereas I think that Members of the Appellate Body might 
rather think of themselves as exercising responsibility. The distinction may be a fine 
one, but it makes all the difference. It is true that adjudicators exercise judgment 
and can never hope to achieve perfect objectivity even if they might strive to do so. 
But I do not think that that residual element of subjectivity can usefully be 
characterised in the same terms as the essentially unfettered power exercised by a 
primary legislator. Obviously, what constrains the adjudicator is that the court is 
limited to interpreting and applying the law. Thus, the question of what are the 
applicable rules of interpretation and how they are to be applied plays an important 
role in delimiting the role of the adjudicator, and thus in turn the power-rules 
relationship. 
The DSU states that the dispute settlement system is to "clarify" the covered 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, but is not to add to or diminish the rights and obligations in the 
covered agreements (DSU, Articles 3.2 and 19.2). There are a number of 
interesting points arising from this provision. 
The first relates to the term "clarify". Unlikely as it may seem, it periodically occurs 
that a litigant in a weak position attempts to argue that WTO adjudicators do not 
actually have the authority to "interpret" WTO law, only to "clarify" it. It is only the 
Members that have the right to seek "authoritative interpretation" through 
decision–making under the WTO Agreement (DSU, Article 3.9). This argument has 
never succeeded, and likely never will, because of the subsequent reference to 
"rules of interpretation" in the same provision, because it is difficult to understand 
what the distinction might be between "clarifying" and "interpreting", and because 
in any event adjudicators can apply the law and the distinction between application 
and interpretation is not a sharp one. On this point, therefore, the rules-based 
approach has to-date prevailed and very likely will continue to do so. 
This leads to a second interesting point, which is the relationship between the 
judicial interpretation referenced in Article 3.2 of the DSU and the Members' 
"authoritative interpretation" referenced in Article 3.9 of the DSU. I think it is 
reasonably clear that the latter would prevail over the former. However, in fact, this 
"victory" for the power-based approach is entirely illusory, since Article 3.9 of the 
DSU has never actually been used, subject as it is to the heavy decision making 
rules in the WTO Agreement, whereas the judicial interpretation referenced in 
Article 3.2 of the DSU has been used very frequently. In practice, therefore, the 
rules-based approach prevails. 
A third point is the tension that exists between the statement that WTO 
adjudicators are to interpret the law and the statement that they are not to add to 
or diminish the rights and obligations provided for in the covered agreements. Once 
again, one often sees a weak litigant invoking the latter statement and ignoring the 
former. This is somewhat self-defeating because even the latter statement is 
doubly two-edged – that is, it refers to both adding and diminishing, as well as to 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 26 
Jamen Flett   Fron the Green Room 
 
both rights and obligations – so it is generally a simple matter for the stronger 
litigant to simply toss the phrase back, and it will generally ring truer in the mouth 
of the stronger litigant. Perhaps more interesting is the tension between the two 
statements themselves. Obviously the process of interpretation may well involve 
resolving apparent conflicts between different provisions of the covered 
agreements. Here, the theory would appear to be that the adjudicator is not adding 
to or diminishing, but simply discovering the law as it always has been - but this 
rather depends on having an agreed interpretative cipher (a point to which I return 
below). Interestingly, there is no reference here to applying the law, it being taken 
for granted, understandably, that that is what adjudicators necessarily do. As 
indicated above, the distinction between interpretation and application is a fine one: 
one can reason in the realm of interpretation that the term "vehicle" is to be 
interpreted as including the notion of a skateboard; or one can reason in the factual 
realm that the skateboard in question is a vehicle. Thus, application clearly does 
involve putting factual meat on the legal bones of the treaty, and it is not easy to 
see how this is possible without in some sense adding to what is initially there – 
and this is indeed what the case law is progressively doing.  
That in turn raises the interesting question of what the limits to this process of 
judicial interpretation and application are. In my view, this is a matter in the hands 
of the legislator at the outset, and is a question of the scope of the legislation in the 
first place. It is for the legislator to set out the material, personal, territorial and 
personal scope of the legislation, and these are the primary parameters that limit 
subsequent judicial activity. If the legislator wishes to place specific matters outside 
the scope of adjudication it can and should do so. An example is that the DSU only 
applies to so-called situation complaints only up to point at which a panel report is 
circulated to the Members (DSU, Article 26.2). Another possibility is for legislators 
to specifically provide that Members have a choice – and an example of that is the 
so-called lesser duty rule under Article 9.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Conversely, if the legislator intends that a given set of rules should be exhaustive 
on a particular subject that may also be provided for. Examples of this include the 
rules in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and SCM Agreement that no specific action 
should be taken against dumping and subsidy other than in accordance with the 
provisions of those agreements (Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 18.1 and SCM 
Agreement, Article 32.1). Such statements confirm that the adjudicator must rule 
on factual issues that fall within the material scope of the rules, even if they are not 
expressly addressed in the legislation. The alternative, which would be to not rule – 
sometimes referred to as a non liquet – simply represents a win for the defending 
Member. 
That in turn leads to an interesting discussion of the "permissible interpretation" 
standard in Article 17(6)(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, a phrase that begs the 
question: who is to judge permissibility? The Appellate Body's interpretation of that 
provision (and notably the prior reference to customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law) is in my view correct (Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing 
II (EC), paras 265 to 275). The doctrine of deference to an administrative 
authority's reasonable interpretation and application of statute (Chevron in the US, 
margin of appreciation in the EU) makes sense in a classic constitutional structure 
of legislature, executive and judiciary. It might make sense, for example, if the 
WTO Secretariat would be properly established as an executive and would have and 
overtly exercise executive power to interpret the WTO Agreement (which is 
generally not the case). It makes no sense when the court acts not in the field of 
administrative law, but rather as a constitutional court. This is not a cultural 
difference between the US and the EU (Brightbill 2006). There might be some 
deference by the CJEU to the other institutions when it acts in the field of 
administrative law; but when the CJEU acts as a constitutional court, one of its 
primary functions is to ensure that EU law has the same meaning throughout the 
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Union. Thus, Article 17(6)(ii) does not introduce some unspecified degree of wiggle 
room for WTO Members. The only range of cases caught by Article 17(6)(ii) will be 
that of two competing interpretations in perfect equipoise (thus preserving the 
meaning of the provision), which is quite likely, as a matter of fact, never to arise. 
'Permissible interpretation' is thus rather like an unsuccessful organ transplant: 
there was no tissue match in the first place; and the rules-based system simply 
cannot assimilate it. 
In short, to conclude on the tension between the two statements, I think it is clear 
that the first statement has systematically prevailed. The adjudicators have been 
busy interpreting and applying the law and in that process inevitably adding to it – 
nor is it possible to conceive of a judicial system that would do otherwise. In this 
light, the second statement appears to be essentially rhetorical, incapable as a 
matter of simple logic of resisting the normal operation of the rules-based 
approach. 
A fourth interesting question is: what are the customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law? At a relatively early stage WTO adjudicators identified 
Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the law of the Treaties. This has been 
enormously important in providing a systematic framework or agreed interpretative 
cipher, especially for the Appellate Body, and that in turn has given considerable 
support for the proposition that the judges are simply discovering the law as it has 
always been – that is, exercising responsibility as opposed to power. However, this 
has in turn provided a new arena for power versus rules tensions. 
One interesting point here is that the DSU does not actually expressly refer to the 
Vienna Convention, and yet that is the manner in which the reference to the 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law has been understood. 
This, in itself, represents a step in favour of the rules-based approach, for two 
reasons. First, if one looks beyond the Vienna Convention there is actually no 
consensus about what the customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law actually are. If the interpretative tool box is uncertain, then this lends itself to a 
power based approach, because interpretative tools can be selected and/or 
weighted as a function of the desired outcome. Similarly, if the interpretative tool 
box is excessively broad then this also lends itself to a power based approach, since 
from a broad range one can also often find an interpretative rule well-suited to a 
particular outcome. The best example of this problem is the in dubio mitius rule, 
according to which, in case of doubt, the obligations entered into by a State in a 
treaty should be interpreted restrictively. This rule is not mentioned in the Vienna 
Convention, yet has been referenced in the WTO – although has not featured in 
more recent cases (Larour 2009).23 My own view is that it might have been suited 
to a past age involving bilateral treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms, but is 
completely unsuited to a multilateral treaty such as the WTO. References to the 
Vienna Convention are sometimes qualified with the specification that it 
consolidates in part the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, 
leaving open the possibility of other rules coming into play, and some observers 
consider that express references to the Vienna Convention are on the decline in the 
case law. In my view, however, it still has an important role to play. Second, not all 
WTO Members are parties to the Vienna Convention (notably the US, a frequent 
party in WTO litigation). Nevertheless they find the treaty consistently applied to 
them in the context of WTO litigation. 
 
                                                 
23 Actually, the reference in Hormones made sense because of the rule that the importing Member sets 
its own ALOP. 
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A further interesting point to note is that other provisions of the Vienna Convention 
have been extensively referenced in the litigation, notwithstanding the fact that 
they do not appear to be rules of interpretation (Flett 2009). Thus, once again, one 
sees a development of the rules-based approach.  
Turning to Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention itself, these provisions are 
sometimes criticised for relegating the preparatory work to a supplementary means 
of interpretation that comes into play only to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of Article 31, or if Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. I think one 
can also see this as something that tends to enhance the rules-based approach. I 
tend to think that appealing to the intent of the Members is rhetorical, and I tend to 
agree with the proposition that, in the context of a multilateral treaty such as the 
WTO, the text of the treaty is best seen as the authentic expression of the parties' 
intent. Experience suggests that such documents as are available are not easy to 
categorise as preparatory work, often being authored by one Member. And in any 
event such documents can often be turned both ways: one can argue that the 
existing text should be understood as reflecting an earlier proposal; or that 
rejection of the earlier proposal precludes that meaning. I recall one third party 
hearing in which Members present were invited to state if, when the WTO treaty 
was negotiated in 1994, they understood a particular provision to have a particular 
meaning. One-by-one each of the dozen or so third parties "raised their flags" and 
carefully confirmed that they had no such intention, the last confirmation coming 
from China – provoking a stage whisper from one member of the panel: "but you 
weren't there" – to some hilarity amongst the delegations. 
Another interesting aspect of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is that, even 
though the title makes it clear that it contains a single general rule of 
interpretation, its different elements (good faith, ordinary meaning, context and 
object and purpose) are often considered in isolation. Even if they are ultimately 
combined, this systematic approach is also something of a product of the rules-
based approach, because it allows the reader to understand how each element of 
the rule has played-out in the context of a particular issue, and even the relative 
weight afforded to each element. 
To conclude with respect to the rules of interpretation, if one looks at the starting 
point, that is, the text of the treaty, and then looks closely at the way in which the 
power versus rules drama has played out in the specific context of the rules of 
interpretation, then what one sees is a systematic preference for the rules-based 
approach. This is hardly surprising. If one asks the question: "do you prefer a 
power-based or a rules-based approach?" in an arena that defines its very identity 
in terms of rules, and this with respect to the basic tools to be used in that arena, it 
seems to me inevitable that the rules-based approach will be preferred. 
3.5.Burden of Proof 
As I think I have already suggested, burden of proof is another one of those issues 
that is a symbol or badge of the judicial function. It shows a particular pre-
occupation not only with the law, but also with the facts and evidence, and this in a 
specifically procedural context, in the sense that, no matter how brilliant your case 
or right you might be, if you have not proven the matter in a timely fashion you will 
lose. 
The DSU itself does not speak expressly to the question of burden of proof, which is 
remarkable for a rules-based system. It is really difficult to see how any court can 
function, or at least function efficiently and in a manner that respects due process, 
without some general rule regarding burden of proof. Not surprisingly this issue 
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arose in one of the earliest cases, and was settled by the Appellate Body by 
drawing widely on other sources of international law (Appellate Body Report, US-
Wool Shirts and Blouses, pages 13 to 16). 
Essentially, the Appellate Body found that the party asserting a particular claim or 
defence (that is, in essence, a particular fact) has the initial burden of adducing 
evidence in support of that fact sufficient to rise to the level of a prima facie case. 
In many respects this is simply a matter of common sense, and hardly constraining 
for the judge, since the question of what amounts to a prima facie case is a matter 
to be judged on a case-by-case basis. Thus, in my view, it is less the substantive 
issue and more the way in which the symbolism of court proceedings is brought 
expressly into the DSU that is perhaps the most important aspect of this judgment. 
In fact, I tend to think that this judgment gave rise to a certain rigidity in the 
distinction between the notions of claim and affirmative defence that has not 
always subsequently served the system well. The WTO Agreement is replete with 
obligations and rights that are scattered across numerous provisions, more than 
one of which may be relevant to any given case. It is not always easy, and often 
not necessary, to particularly determine which provision forms the basis for a claim 
and which the basis for an "affirmative" defence. Rather, applying a bit of robust 
judicial common sense, and if necessary putting questions to the parties, it should 
not be unduly problematic to elicit the evidence necessary to decide a case one way 
or the other (Grando 2009). 
3.6.Inherent Jurisdiction 
Another particular feature of a court is its capacity to decide issues arising before it 
from time-to-time and especially those that go to the orderly conduct of the 
proceedings. Again, this is an area in which the operation of the DSU has resulted 
in a clarification in the jurisprudence to the effect that panels and the Appellate 
Body have such jurisdiction (Appellate Body Report,  Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 
21.5 - US), para. 36; Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, paras 
42 and 51 to 52; Appellate Body Report, US-Continued Suspension, para. 433; 
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 433; Panel Report, 
India – Patents (EC), paras 7.9 to 7.24 (ruling on the propriety of its own 
establishment); Panel Report, Australia – Automotive Leather II, paras 9.13 to 9.15 
(assessing the substance of Australia's claim that, on a proper interpretation of the 
DSU, the panel was established – also through the actions of the DSB – 
inconsistently with the DSU)). Once again, therefore, this makes an important 
contribution to the rules-based system. 
3.7.Managing the Docket 
There are a number of other issues that have arisen during the course of WTO 
litigation and that one would normally expect to find regulated or properly 
regulated in a court's rules of procedure. They are different but related, in the 
sense that in one way or another they all go to the ability of the court to control the 
cases coming before it, and so I have grouped them together under this heading, 
and would briefly summarise them as follows. 
First, in one of its earliest cases the Appellate Body confirmed that there was no 
requirement under the DSU for a complaining Member to demonstrate what was 
referred to as a "legal interest". It was enough for them to complain that another 
Member's measure is WTO inconsistent. This arose in the EC-Bananas III case 
because the US was not a producer of bananas. I think that this is an 
extraordinarily important statement of principle from a rules-based point of view, 
even if in practice its full implications have yet to work their way through the 
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system, given that Members do not generally litigate without an underlying 
commercial interest. 
Second, a well-known aspect of the DSU is that it does not provide any remand 
authority for the Appellate Body. That is, the Appellate Body cannot reverse a 
panel, and send the matter back to the same panel for re-determination. The 
Appellate Body can only uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and 
conclusions of a panel (DSU, Article 17.13). The Appellate Body has responded to 
this situation by deciding that it does have the authority to "complete the analysis". 
That is, having reversed a panel finding, the Appellate Body may itself be prepared 
to determine the matter. Generally, it is only prepared to do this on the basis of 
facts in the record of the proceeding that are uncontested. The somewhat tenuous 
legal basis for this is the proposition that the DSU seeks prompt settlement of 
disputes (DSU, Article 3.3). This does create a significant amount of discretion for 
the Appellate Body, because it is not always clear whether or not particular facts 
have been fully evidenced or fully contested, and I think that the existence of that 
discretion is born out by the subsequent case-law, which is perhaps not always fully 
consistent on the question of when it is appropriate to complete the analysis. I 
think that this is an interesting example of a development of the rules-based 
system which seems to comport with common sense and to which none of the 
Members appear to object in principle. However, that does not necessary make it 
consistent with Article 17 of the DSU. 
Third, and in similar vein, the Appellate Body has developed a technique of 
sometimes declaring panel findings moot and of no legal effect. Presumably, it does 
this because it does not wish to uphold, modify or reverse – however, once again, 
that does not necessarily make it consistent with Article 17 of the DSU. 
Fourth, and in similar vein, the Appellate Body sometimes purports to exercise 
"judicial economy". This is in itself a very difficult concept, especially given the 
mandate of WTO judges to assess conformity of a measure with the covered 
agreements, and the distinction between correct and "false" exercise of judicial 
economy is a difficult one. However, perhaps more significantly, it is not at all easy 
to square this practice with the specific rule in Article 17.12 of the DSU that the 
Appellate Body is required to address each of the issues raised during the appellate 
proceedings. 
Fifth, another significant area is the rule in Article 17.6 of the DSU that an appeal 
shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations 
developed by a panel. By implication, this would seem to exclude appeals on points 
of fact. However, it is notably that the Appellate Body has decided that the legal 
characterisation of facts (that is, mixed questions of law and fact) are legal issues 
susceptible to appeal. Similarly, the Appellate Body has decided that the meaning 
of municipal law is also an issue susceptible to appeal. Finally, the Appellate Body 
has shown itself increasingly open to appeals pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU 
alleging that a panel has failed to make an objective assessment of the facts. This 
is just an appeal on the facts by another name. I think that we may be currently 
seeing some of the consequences of this relative opening of the Appellate Body's 
mandate in the form of very long and factually intensive Appellate Body reports, as 
well as some difficulty in adhering to the very tight time limits for appeal set out in 
the DSU. 
Sixth and finally another area that will surely see further developments is the area 
of preliminary rulings. These are not provided for in the DSU but common practice 
in panel proceedings. This has generated a number of open legal questions, such as 
can one immediately appeal a preliminary ruling; is one precluded from doing so 
later; and can a panel change its mind on a preliminary issue in its final report. 
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In short, in all of these areas, I think that what we can see is a substantial 
development of the rules-based system repeatedly based on crystallising ambiguity 
in the DSU and the exercise of discretion. Whilst I think that some are legally 
correct, the legitimacy of some others appears to rest rather on the fact that they 
make good sense and the Members do not object. 
3.8.Relations With Other Jurisdictions 
The next issue I would like to address is the relationship between WTO law and 
particularly the WTO dispute settlement system and other international law and 
domestic law. Just as a key issue for any nation is how it sees itself in relation to 
other nations, so a key issue for any court is how it sees itself in relation to other 
jurisdictions and courts.  
With respect to other international law a lot of work has been done at the 
theoretical level to explain what the relationship might or might not be. My own 
view is that there is not enough material in the case law to support firm conclusions 
about how this issue may develop in the future (Flett 2009). In any event, I am not 
persuaded that WTO adjudicators are generally following a theoretical approach on 
this issue. Rather, I think that they might be following what might be termed a 
more modern and pragmatic approach, as other courts, including the CJEU, appear 
to be doing, faced with a proliferation of international law. A close analysis of the 
WTO Agreement reveals that there are in fact many points of contact between WTO 
law and other international law, probably inevitably so, and that such other 
international law is also spilling-over and otherwise influencing in more subtle ways 
the development of WTO law. In short, the relationship between WTO law and other 
international law is happening on the ground, even if there is no grand theory to 
explain exactly what is happening or why it is happening. Against this background I 
think it fair to say that as the rules-based system of the WTO is developing, it is at 
the same time gradually taking its inevitable place within the overarching structures 
of international law in general. 
With respect to domestic law, the important issues that remain to be explored 
include not only the significance of direct effect in some monist Members, but also 
the question of an interpretation in conformity rule, and whether Article XVI:4 of 
the WTO Agreement requires such a rule to be present in domestic law.24  
3.9.Limiting Dissent 
Another area that I would briefly like to address, without repeating what I have 
written elsewhere (Flett 2010b), is the question of dissents. In short, these have 
been thankfully infrequent in the WTO to-date, which I think is a good thing. Also, 
they have been even less frequent in the Appellate Body, probably reflecting the 
more collegial approach, which is also a good thing.  
3.10.Precedent 
Precedent is also an important area that I have already touched on above, and here 
also the Appellate Body has significantly contributed to the development of the 
rules-based approach (Appellate Body Report, US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras 
160 to 161). 
                                                 
24 If this area were to be further explored and developed, then I would not agree with the conclusion of 
(Abbot et al. 2000) that even hard international law (that is, the WTO) does not approach stereo-typical 
conceptions of law based on advanced domestic legal systems, anymore than I would agree with such a 
statement with respect to EU law. 
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3.11.Open hearings 
Open hearings are an important aspect of any court system, and thankfully the 
WTO is gradually expanding the use of open hearings. 
3.12.Lawyers in the delegation 
Another interesting question that has arisen is whether or not Members are 
permitted to include private lawyers in their delegations at oral hearings. Under the 
GATT there was a convention that this was not permitted, the reasoning being that 
the discussion was between sovereign states and confidential, and that the 
essential purpose was to find a resolution or settlement of the dispute. Previously a 
lawyer in private practice, I have myself represented governments in GATT disputes 
and had the frustrating experience of drafting the written and oral briefs, but being 
left to sit in the corridor, and to read panel reports that some might think more 
diplomatic than legal. Even under the WTO it has occurred that one delegation has 
immediately exited from consultations when the other party turned up with 
lawyers, on the grounds that the purpose of consultations is to search for an 
amicable settlement and not to prepare the ground for litigation. The matter is not 
expressly addressed in the DSU, so the stage was set for an interesting discussion, 
which arose in one of the early cases (EC-Bananas III).  
Before the panel, the complainants (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the 
US) objected to the presence of private lawyers, and the panel "requested" the 
parties and third parties to observe the guidelines set out in its working procedures, 
which referred to governments. It is interesting that the panel did not rule on this 
matter, but the "request" appears to have been something that the participants 
would not have been in a position to refuse. The panel based its request on the 
following considerations: past GATT and WTO practice; the terms of its own 
working procedures; unfairness to participants who had not brought their lawyers 
with them; confidentiality; unfairness to smaller Members; and the 
intergovernmental character of the proceedings (Panel Report, EC-Bananas III, 
paras 7.10 to 7.12). In the appeal proceedings Saint Lucia, supported by Canada 
and Jamaica, re-iterated the request, still opposed by the complainants, and the 
Appellate Body agreed. The Appellate Body reasoned that nothing in the covered 
agreements precluded it; that it might be important for developing countries (who 
would not generally have the same level of in-house expertise as Members such as 
the US and EU); and that appeals are limited to issues of law and legal 
interpretation, so it is important that representatives be qualified counsel (Appellate 
Body Report, EC-Bananas III, paras 4 to 12). Today, this is standard practice both 
before the Appellate Body and panels (Sacerdoti 2005). 
I think this development was important for the rules-based approach for several 
reasons.  
First, in my view, one of the most significant aspects of it, at least initially, was 
symbolic. Just as there are certain "badges" of statehood, so I think there are 
certain "badges" of a court – and permitting representation by outside lawyers is, in 
my view, one of those badges. It sends the message that this is litigation, not 
diplomacy. It suggests that this is a technical exercise for specialists arguing about 
and eventually searching for the "truth"; not a political exercise in which any 
outcome is possible. 
Second, I think it has a spill-over effect within Members: it enhances the view that 
the business of the DSU is a matter for lawyers and not generalists. One of the 
things that happened within the EU Commission when the WTO was created was 
that responsibility for representing the EU in WTO litigation shifted from generalists 
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(within DG Trade) to lawyers (within the Commission Legal Service). I do think this 
is important, because whilst judges decide, they can only work with the material 
that is provided to them. The skills of a lawyer, especially in litigation, and 
especially in an area as technical as the WTO, are not something that can in my 
view be rapidly acquired without appropriate training and experience. There is also 
a process by which litigation lawyers acquire a good feel for how a judge is going to 
interpret and apply the law, based on a balanced, rational and reasonable 
understanding of the rules. There is no doubt in my mind that this is a process that 
also contributes to bridging gaps between domestic constituents, also in different 
Members, with opposing economic interests. 
Third, I would agree with the Appellate Body that this could be a matter of concern 
for smaller Members. It is interesting on this point to see how for the panel and the 
Appellate Body this same consideration worked in opposite directions. The panel 
seems to have been worried that private lawyers might be too expensive. The 
Appellate Body seems to have been worried that smaller Member might not have 
the same in-house expertise as larger Members. I think the Appellate Body was 
correct, and that the concerns about cost have since been addressed at least in part 
by the creation of the Advisory Centre for WTO Law. Thus, once again the rules are 
interpreted so as to enhance the protection for weaker Members – that is, in a 
manner that contributes to the rules-based approach. 
Fourth, I think that this approach has probably contributed to the gradual 
emergence of a WTO law "bar". It is true that private lawyers were already active in 
this area, if not in the oral hearings themselves. But I think that presence in the 
oral hearing enhances that process. This is all the more so since the move to open 
hearings, since a wider audience becomes aware of the participation of private 
lawyers (their participation is not recorded in briefs or reports). There is no doubt in 
my mind that the creation of a WTO law "bar" is part of the process that is driving 
the gradual development of the rules based approach, just as the anti-trust bar has 
surely significantly contributed to the legalistic nature of competition law. I think 
that the continuing evolution of a WTO law "bar" also has other more subtle effects. 
In structural terms it creates an additional counterpoint to complement the 
perspectives of the WTO institutions, Members and academics. There is a 
considerable amount of academic and other material being produced by such 
practitioners. They frequently participate and support conferences. They also 
provide a significant and relatively flexible employment base, with individuals quite 
frequently moving between the private sector and other WTO related activities. This 
contributes to cross-fertilisation and networking that breaks down formal barriers 
and contributes to the emergence of shared views. 
Fifth, if one looks at the different ways in which Members actually use private 
lawyers, I think it is clear that there are other dynamics at play. The big players, 
such as the US and the EU have their own in-house counsel. I am not sure I have 
ever seen a private lawyer in a US delegation. The EU has recourse to outside 
lawyers relatively infrequently and only in specific circumstances, and even less 
frequently allows them to speak at oral hearings (although this does happen). 
Japan sometimes permits private lawyers in its delegation, but never lets them 
speak. Interestingly, Members such as Korea and particularly China, an increasingly 
important player in WTO litigation, are increasingly relying on private lawyers to a 
considerable extent during oral hearings. This is particularly so when one gets 
beyond reading out the "oral" statements and into questions, and particularly 
before the Appellate Body, where there is no opportunity to subsequently submit 
written answers to questions. There would appear to be a language consideration at 
work here. The WTO official languages are English, French and Spanish, with most 
litigation conducted in English, to the advantage, especially, of US lawyers. Thus, in 
retrospect, whether intended at the time or not, I think that the Appellate Body's 
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decision has been an important factor in drawing China and other Members more 
tightly into DSU litigation, thus contributing indirectly to the overall coherence and 
rules-based character of the system. 
3.13.The role of third parties 
The next point that I would like to comment on relates to the role of third parties, 
whom I believe have made a significant if not always recognised contribution to the 
rules-based system. Amongst the main players in WTO litigation there are only a 
few that intervene in all or almost all cases, including the US and the EU, but also 
Japan. They do so not only because of their trade interest in the particular case, but 
also because of a wider systemic interest in the correct interpretation and 
application of the covered agreements. That in turn implies that what is decided in 
one case is of wider interest to other Members in other cases – that is, that there is 
some informal system of precedent. That indeed is what the Appellate Body has 
recently confirmed (Appellate Body Report, US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras 160 
to 161). 
The point that I would like to make is that it is not at all clear from a close study of 
the DSU that it was ever intended that third party intervention should extend 
beyond a trade interest to include a systemic interest. At the consultation stage, 
Article 4.11 of the DSU requires a substantial trade interest and the agreement of 
the defending Member. It is not immediately clear that when Article 10.2 of the 
DSU (which relates to third party rights) subsequently refers to a "substantial 
interest" it is referring to something more than a trade interest. Nevertheless, this 
is the practice that has developed, probably influenced by the fact that larger WTO 
Members such as the US and EU tend to intervene in all cases, and often reserve 
their third party rights orally in the DSB. It seem inconceivable now that this matter 
would ever be re-considered. 
3.14.Amicus curiae 
The amicus curiae discussion is often discussed as an instance where expressions of 
discontent by the Members constrained the actions of the Appellate Body. I am not 
sure that is the case because I think that the Appellate Body is correct. I rather 
think that the issue has not come to the fore for the time being because experience 
suggests that such briefs do not tend to contain material that is interesting from a 
legal point of view. They do not normally speak to issues or fact or evidence. They 
cannot add claims. And parties are generally pretty good at spotting and setting out 
the arguments. So I see the matter more in terms of public relations. It may be 
that the advent of open hearings may have some effect here, although it may work 
both ways. On the one hand the increased transparency might diminish the 
pressure for further movement on amicus briefs. On the other hand, once others 
see the arguments raging back and forth it cannot be excluded that they may be 
encouraged to return to this matter (Durling and Hardin 2005, Howse 2006). 
3.15.Time limits 
Another interesting area is to compare the time limit rules before panels with those 
before the Appellate Body. Time limits are one of the badges of a court, and the 
thing about them is that they are essentially binary. One either complies or does 
not, and many cases have been lost and won on that basis. Before panels the rule 
is generally although not always couched in terms of "should". In the Appellate 
Body the rule is "shall" (Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Rule 18.1). 
There are issues here about Members' different time zones in relation to Geneva, 
but in my view the logic for allowing for that disappears entirely or almost entirely 
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with modern electronic means of communication and filing. In a number of cases 
parties have tried to have the other side's brief excluded as untimely. So far this 
has not been successful before panels. However, in my view, it is only a question of 
time before the Appellate Body accepts such an argument. 
3.16.The operation of the negative consensus rule in practice 
There are some fascinating legal problems associated with the "negative 
consensus" rule, each of which represents, in my view, a particular stress point 
where the political and legal perspectives again collide or come together. They are 
like raindrops that reflect and focus the complex universe that surrounds them.  
One of these problems is whether the special evidence discovery procedures in 
Annex V of the SCM Agreement, the existence of which reflects the fact that 
Members often hide the subsidies they grant, operate together with the special 
panel establishment rule in Article 7.4 of the SCM Agreement, that is, by negative 
consensus; or whether an Annex V procedure could only be launched by consensus 
(allowing the defending Member to strangle the entire process by starving it of 
information). The problem is that Article 7.4 refers expressly to negative consensus 
and Annex V refers back to Article 7.4, but Annex V does not itself refer to negative 
consensus – speaking only of the DSB "initiating" the Annex V process. My own 
view is that, on a proper construction, the negative consensus rule applies, because 
the default rule in the DSU for all dispute related matters is action by negative 
consensus. However, it remains to be seen how this matter will be decided when 
and if it comes to be litigated.  
The second problem relates to what is something of a conventional wisdom to the 
effect that the first item on the agenda of any DSB meeting is approval of the 
agenda, which is a decision by consensus (Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the 
Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General Council, Rule 6) allowing the 
defending Member to block. This temporarily happened, for example, following the 
Arbitration Panel in the US-Byrd case, and more recently when Taiwan objected to 
the appointment of a Chinese Member of the Appellate Body. Here again, my view 
is that the conventional wisdom is wrong because the DSU mandates adoption of 
the report by negative consensus and, on a proper construction, this trumps the 
rule regarding approval of the agenda. 
A third interesting question is how a report gets onto the DSB agenda. In my view, 
it would be reasonable and correct to take the view that it is automatically on the 
agenda, since Article 16.4 of the DSU provides simply that reports shall be adopted 
by the DSB within 60 days. However, the conventional wisdom here appears to be 
that someone must place it on the agenda, and this has resulted in one report not 
being adopted (Panel Report, EC-Bananas III (Article 21.5 – EC) (unadopted)). 
3.17.Enforcing the Judgment 
An important issue for any court is how its judgment is to be enforced. In the WTO 
the remedy is authorised retaliation equivalent to the "nullification or impairment" 
arising from the WTO inconsistent measure, which is usually taken to mean the 
imposition of punitive trade sanctions with effect from the end of the reasonable 
period of time for compliance (DSU, Article 22). This is often criticised as being 
harmful to the retaliating Member, of little use to smaller or developing countries, 
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In my view this is an area where the WTO dispute settlement system still has a 
substantial amount of room to further develop the rules-based system. There have 
only been about a dozen cases to-date none of which have reached the Appellate 
Body, apparently because of a conventional wisdom, certainly erroneous in my 
view, that such matters cannot be appealed.25 Consequently these matters have 
been handled by the original panels (that is, within the Secretariat) and have 
generally been characterised by an apparent hostility towards trade restrictive 
measures (forgetting that this is a means of enforcing the agreement to trade); 
increasingly complex, impenetrable and subjective economic analysis (under the 
influence of economists); and a lack of imagination when it comes to interpreting 
and applying the relevant legal provisions. In particular, the tendency has been to 
read the DSU as if it ultimately requires the complaining Member to demonstrate 
injury and causality, whereas in fact it provides that the nullification or impairment 
is presumed (DSU, Article 3.8). Furthermore, in my view, retaliation could take 
many different forms, provided that it is "equivalent", even extending to 
expropriation of assets on the complaining Member's territory. I also do not see 
why third parties at least cannot join a case as the stage of retaliation (since they 
will also have invoked the DSU) or participate from the outset pursuant to 9 of the 
DSU (without actually doing any work). In addition, if equivalence would also be 
understood for example relative to GDP, I do not see why smaller Members having 
successfully litigated against larger Members could not trade their retaliation rights 
at a handsome rate. Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom, I do not see 
anything in the DSU that would preclude assessment of remedies ex tunc, as 
opposed to from the end of the reasonable period of time. In my view, approaches 
such as these could overcome most if not all of the problems identified with the 
WTO system of remedies. If this area were to be further explored and developed, 
then I would not agree with the conclusion of Abbot and Snidal (2000) that even 
hard international law (that is, the WTO) does not approach stereo-typical 
conceptions of law based on advanced domestic legal systems, anymore than I 
would agree with such a statement with respect to EU law. 
4. The Members' Response 
4.1.DSB minutes 
One of the places where the Members' respond to what is going on in the WTO 
dispute settlement system is at the DSB meeting at which reports are adopted. 
These comments are recorded in the DSB minutes. The DSU specifically provides 
that the adoption of reports is without prejudice to the Members' right to express 
their views (DSU, Article 16.4 and Article 17.14). The comments are usually fairly 
predictable – the winning Member generally congratulates itself and the losing 
Member complains about the result. I think it is fair to say that these comments are 
generally lost in the sands of time – people generally refer to the reports and few 
bother looking at the minutes of the DSB. But there are exceptions. 
 
                                                 
25 Appeals lie from "panel cases" (DSU, Article 17.1) and such matters are decided by "the original 
panel" (Article 22.6), which is also described as an "arbitrator". Article 1 of the DSU provides that the 
DSU applies to disputes concerning the DSU itself and Article 3.5 of the DSU requires all arbitration 
panel reports to be consistent with the DSU. When appeal is precluded the DSU specifically provides for 
that (Article 26.2). The requirement that the parties accept the decision as final (Article 22.7) precludes 
a second arbitration panel but not an appeal, and in any event does not preclude an appeal that seeks 
reversal of a legal error without any change in the award itself (and particularly when the arbitration 
panel has exceeded its jurisdiction). 
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On some occasions a Member has sought to have its document also circulated in 
the same series as the report (that is, with the same "DS" number) and this has 
been accepted, although the practice has also been questioned. This may raise the 
profile of the criticism to some extent, but it is probably of relatively little value. All 
or almost all of these comments relate to particular cases and do not relate to what 
I would call systemic issues. 
4.2.DSU review 
A 1994 WTO Ministerial Decision invited the Ministerial Conference to complete a 
full review of dispute settlement rules and procedures within four years after the 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement (that is, by 1 January 1999), and to take a 
decision on the occasion of its first meeting after the completion of the review 
whether to continue, modify or terminate the DSU rules and procedures (1994 
Ministerial Decision). The review started in the DSB in 1997 and the time limit was 
extended to 31 July 1999 (WT/DSB/M/52), but there was no agreement. The Doha 
Ministerial Declaration of November 2001 agreed that negotiations should continue 
and aim to reach agreement not later than May 2003, and that they should not be 
part of the "single undertaking", that is, they should not be tied to the success or 
failure of the other negotiations (Doha Ministerial Declaration, November 2001). 
Following the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration the negotiations are continuing 
without a deadline (Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration).  
The Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee reported to the DSB most 
recently on 22 March 2010 (TN/DS/24, 22 March 2010). The DSB was informed 
that discussions were continuing on the basis of the consolidated draft legal text 
contained in the document issued under the Chairman's responsibility in July 2008 
(JOB(08)/81 of 18 July 2008). The DSB was informed that that document covered 
the following issues: third party rights; panel composition; remand; mutually 
agreed solutions; strictly confidential information; sequencing; post-retaliation; 
transparency and amicus curiae briefs; timeframes; developing country interest, 
including special and differential treatment; flexibility and Member control; and 
effective compliance. Although the draft text of July 2008 is not a public document, 
the working documents of the DSU negotiations (including those containing 
proposals from Members) are public documents. The following brief summary of the 
main issues is based on the public working documents insofar as they relate to 
matters indicated by the Chairman to be included in the draft text of July 2008. 
As a preliminary comment, it is interesting to note that there is a curious dynamic 
between DSU review and adjudication that sometimes comes to the fore. It quite 
often happens that issues that could quite easily be decided on the basis of the 
existing rules are put forward in the context of negotiations. Both communities 
sometimes draw inappropriate conclusions. Thus, sometimes the political 
community assumes that if a matter is the subject of negotiations it is off-limits for 
the judges. That assumption is clearly incorrect. Conversely, litigants sometime 
argue against a particular interpretation of the DSU because it happens to be 
something that the other party is pursuing in any event in the negotiation. That 
assumption is also incorrect. 
With respect to third parties, the proposals include a time-limit within which to 
intervene (10 days), which is in any event already provided for in a DSB minute, as 
well as for enhanced third party rights, which is in any event not precluded by the 
existing text. There is also a suggestion to exclude third parties from confidential 
information – something that would represent a move away from the rules-based 
approach if it is not properly handled. 
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With respect to panel composition, there is a proposal for a long list on which 
parties would express preferences and panels would be composed on the basis of 
such preferences. There are some positive aspects to this proposal, but on balance 
it moves the centre of gravity of the matter away from the existing "institutional" 
text of the DSU and back towards the parties and as such represent a backward 
step, in my view. 
With respect to remand, there is a proposal to permit one or both parties to remand 
a matter back to the original panel if the Appellate Body is unable to complete the 
analysis.  
With respect to confidential information there are proposals to provide better 
protection for confidential information throughout the process. However, these do 
not in my view yet adequately explain how the tension between that objective and 
the open and rules-based nature of the system is to be resolved. 
With respect to the so-called sequencing issue, there are proposals to resolve the 
apparent tensions in the existing text of the DSU, although in my view it is a simple 
matter of construction to reach the conclusion that the periods set out in Article 
22.6 of the DSU run from the date of the adoption of the final report in compliance 
proceedings, and constrain the institutions, but not the complaining Member. 
With respect to post-retaliation there is a proposal to allow for "reverse" compliance 
panels – although in my view that matter has already been correctly settled on the 
basis of the existing text of the DSU in the US-Continued Suspension cases. 
There are also proposals with respect to open hearings and amicus curiae briefs – 
both issues that in my view may be adequately dealt with on the basis of the 
existing text of the DSU. 
There are proposals under the heading of "flexibility and Member control", including 
guidance to adjudicators, although it is not clear how these, and especially the 
latter, extend beyond mere rhetoric or add anything to what is already in the text 
of the DSU. 
Finally, there are some interesting proposals on compliance, including collective 
enforcement, nullification or impairment during the reasonable period of time, and 
more flexibility on cross-retaliation.  Again, some of the issues in my view could be 
resolved on the basis of the existing text of the DSU. 
Taken as a whole, one of the things that I think is quite striking about these 
proposals is that they do not appear to directly threaten the principle of binding 
"hard law" adjudication in itself. Rather, they mostly seek to address technical 
issues, or in some instances contain essentially rhetorical re-formulations of 
existing problems, that add little to the existing text of the DSU (Evans and De 
Tarso Pereira 2006, Hughes 2006, Bourgeois 2006, Brinza 2006, Cottier 2006). In 
other words, taken as whole, the Membership appears quite content with the 
process by which the rules-based approach has crystallised. 
That said, I think it is problematic to witness a process by which the core document 
of the rules-based system is tossed into the scrum of political negotiations. One 
sometimes has the impression that some damage might be done inadvertently. One 
even sometimes has the impression that some aspects of the discussion might 
indeed reflect hesitancy about the central role of the WTO adjudicator. It must be a 
painful process for the adjudicators to watch and they must have their hearts in 
their mouths in the hope that the negotiators will "do no harm" to the system. In 
my view, the best people to deal with what are in essence the court rules of 
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procedure, that is, secondary rules (rules about rules) that are central to the 
system, are the judges themselves, possibly subject to some light control of the 
Members (as in the case of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review). This is 
common in other jurisdictions, including the EU. The most enlightened proposal 
would be to allow the Appellate Body to draw up any necessary proposed changes 
to the DSU, in close consultation with the Director-General, and subsequently the 
Members. 
5. Conclusion 
The WTO provides an opportunity to observe the recent creation, development and 
operation of a "hard law" adjudicative legal system, with legal subjects of greatly 
varying degrees of power, embedded within an intensely political environment. 
Between these parallel political and legal communities there are numerous points of 
contact. At each point of contact one finds played out (or to be played out) and 
resolved, re-iteratively, the basic drama between power-based and rules-based 
approaches to disputes. An examination of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
and of subsequent developments - from the particular perspective of a participant 
within the WTO legal system - suggests that the rules-based approach was initiated 
in a somewhat low profile manner. Once the process had been quietly booted-up, 
ambiguity and discretion embedded in the rules has been systematically 
crystallizing, under the influence of lawyers and adjudicators acting both in and out 
of the court room, so as to substantially further develop and consolidate a more 
complete rules-based operating system. This is something to which the Members 
themselves do not appear to have objected. In the long term, the fundamental 
driving motor for this process, which ultimately outweighs all other considerations, 
is a necessity recognised by all participants and their constituents – that is, legal 
security and predictability for firms engaged in international trade. However, the 
legitimacy of particular outcomes will ultimately continue to rest upon the 
rationality, reasonableness and openness of adjudicators and their judgments. This 
repetitive process of shared experience and palliative outcome is progressively 
binding the political and legal communities together in a shared fate. The process is 
proving remarkably successful, and may both serve as a model for (and have spill-
over effects in) other areas of international law. Ultimately, the system's continued 
success depends upon jealously guarding the independence of adjudicators, 
including the process by which they are selected, as well as ensuring the availability 
of effective remedies. 
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